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ESSAY
THE TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
ALAN J. MEEESE*
For decades, economists have offered competing theories of
the firm. Such theories begin by answering one straightforward
question: Why do firms exist? After all, everything that a firm does
could also be done "by the market," through a contract of purchase
and sale.1 A lawyer can employ a secretary to type her briefs, or she
can pay a typing service to do so. Why do individuals organize firms
instead of conducting their activities through market contracting?
Any answer to this question begs a related one, namely, once a firm
is formed, what leads it to perform some activities internally, while
relying on "the market" to complete others?2 (A law firm can pay its
employees to make 100 copies of a brief; it can also pay the copy
service across the street to do so.) These questions have occupied
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Virginia; Cabell Research Professor of Law,
William and Mary School of Law. J.D., The University of Chicago; A.B., The College of
William and Mary. The William and Mary School of Law provided a generous summer
research grant in support of this project. Jeanne Gordon assisted in preparation of the
manuscript. The author wishes to thankparticipants in faculty workshops at the University
of Virginia School of Law and the William and Mary School of Law, as well as Curtis
Bradley, Richard Hynes, Julia Mahoney, Paul Mahoney, Alemante Selassie, and Gordon
Smith for helpful comments.
1. Steven Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-5 (1983);
R.H. Coase, TheNature of the Firm, 4 EcoNomIcA 386,388 (1937) ("Having regard to the fact
that if production is regulated by price movements, production could be carried on without
any organisation at all, well might we ask, why is there any organisation?").
2. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 3, 15-16 (1988).
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the attention of many eminent economists, with seemingly fruitful
results.'
A complete theory of the firm can do more than explain why
individuals create firms and what those firms do; it can also help
explain what type of firms people create. After all, individuals do
not merely form firms: they create partnerships, sole propri-
etorships, and corporations, just to name a few. (Everything that a
partnership does could also be done by a corporation, and vice
versa.) While a robust theory of the firm should explain why two
lawyers might choose to form a firm, and why that firm might
choose to make its own copies instead of relying upon independent
contractors, it can also explain why the lawyers might choose to
organize as a partnership instead of as a sole proprietorship or a
corporation.
Economists and legal scholars have spent significant effort
attempting to explain why individuals might choose one form
of business organization over another.4 In so doing, they have
paid particular attention to the economics of the publicly held
corporation. Thus, economists and legal scholars have sought
economic explanations for various features of the public corporation
that distinguish it from other forms of business organization. Why
do the purported "owners" of public corporations delegate control
over "their" property to managers who may have little or no
financial stake in the enterprise? Why are courts so deferential to
business decisions made by directors and managers of publicly held
corporations who are (apparently) unaccountable as a practical
matter to anyone? These and other questions have occupied
scholars for some time now.
In the past two decades, a consensus of sorts has emerged about
the economic function of the public corporation and the state laws
that enable its formation. According to this dominant account,
3. Classic contributions include: Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Coase, supra
note 1, passim; see also OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
(1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS]; OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS
AND HIERARCHIES (1975); George Stigler, The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of
the Market, 59 J. POL. ECON. 192 (1951).
4. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIsCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991); HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996).
[Vol. 43:16291630
2002] THE TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW 1631
enterprises choose the corporate form over other types of business
organization to realize the gains produced by the separation of
ownership from control. This separation enables a specialization of
function: Shareholders supply capital and bear the risk that comes
with their claim to the firm's residual product, and managers act as
shareholders' agents, using their expertise to deploy the principals'
capital in various ventures.
While the separation of ownership from control and the
specialization it reflects can produce enormous benefits, it also
comes with a potential cost. By placing their capital under the
control of specialists, shareholders subject themselves to a unique
risk of opportunism. Without any financial stake in the enterprise,
managers and the directors who supervise them may shirk their
duty to manage the corporation in the shareholders' interest. Thus,
it is said, corporate law and the market mechanisms that support
it have evolved to facilitate and preserve the specialization of
function while at the same time reducing the "agency costs" that
would otherwise accompany the separation of ownership from
control.6 This "principal-agent" account of the public corporation, in
turn, implies a "shareholder primacy norm," i.e., a recognition that
directors and managers do and should run the corporation so as to
maximize the wealth of a single owner, namely, shareholders.7
Because theyhold an exclusive property right in the firm's residual,
it is said, shareholders will internalize the costs and benefits of the
firm's actions, operating, as they do, in a setting of relatively low
transaction costs.
8
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have offered a competing
hypothesis about the nature and purposes of the public corpo-
ration.9 As they see things, public corporations do not "belong" to
shareholders in any meaningful sense, and directors are not
properly viewed as shareholder agents. Instead, directors of public
5. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 27-31, 173-85 and accompanying text.
7. See generally Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277
(1998) (describing and critiquing shareholder primacy norm), See also infra notes 30-31 and
accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
9. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
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corporations are best regarded as "mediating hierarchs," who are
accountable to no particular constituency of the firm.' ° According to
Blair and Stout, the public corporation is best viewed as a team of
shareholders, creditors, workers, managers, and communities."
Shareholders are not the only group that make investments that
are specific to this "team": creditors, workers, managers, and
communities also make investments that are most productive when
employed in connection with the corporate enterprise. 2 Like
shareholders, who face the risk of opportunism by managers, these
other constituencies run the risk of exploitation by shareholders. As
a result, it is said, these groups may be reluctant to place their
human and financial capital under the control of managers and
directors obligated under the shareholder primacy norm "ruthlessly
[to] pursue shareholders' interests."" Thus, instead of overseeing
managers with a view toward maximizing the wealth of
shareholders, they say, directors do and should view themselves as
"mediating hierarchs" who resolve competing claims to the
collective residual produced by the firm's activities."'
By depriving shareholders of an exclusive property right in the
team's residual, it is said, a mediating hierarch model of governance
can empower firms to make credible commitments to refrain from
opportunistic behavior directed at members of the team, thus
lowering the cost of obtaining team-specific investment from
shareholders, creditors, employees, and communities. 5 According
to Blair and Stout, then, this mediating hierarch model of corporate
governance can reduce the transaction costs associated with
obtaining relationship-specific investments and is thus economically
superior to the principal-agent model.'6 This analysis is confirmed,
they say, by an examination of Delaware corporate law. More
precisely, Blair and Stout assert that their mediating hierarch
10. Id. at 276-87.
11. Id. at 250.
12. Id. at 286-87.
13. Id. at 280 (asserting that the principal-agent accountimplies such a dutyby directors
and managers).
14. Id. at 276-82.
15. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text (explaining Blair and Stout's argument
to this effect).
16. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 280-84.
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model provides a plausible account of numerous features of
Delaware law that the principal-agent model purportedly cannot
explain. 7 As a result, they conclude, the mediating hierarch model
should replace the principal-agent model as the paradigm scholars
employ to examine and evaluate public corporation law.'"
Blair and Stout are not the only scholars who have argued
that directors of public corporations do and should "mediate"
between competing claims of a firm's stakeholders. In recent
years, several critics of the principal-agent model have reached
similar conclusions and concomitantly called for rejection of
the shareholder primacy norm.'9 Unlike most of these scholars,
however, Blair and Stout have relied solely and explicitly on the
dictates of economic efficiency, eschewing noneconomic consid-
erations such as "fairness," "social justice," and "communi-
tarianism."° By refusing to invoke such amorphous concepts, the
application of which necessarily varies from context to context,
Blair and Stout have constructed a rigorous, internally coherent
model with potentially universal application to any number of
corporate law problems. 2' Indeed, as noted earlier, Blair and Stout
believe that this paradigm provides a complete account of the
rationale for public corporations and thus the rules of corporate law
that enable their formation and regulate their activities.22 Several
17. See id. at 287-319.
18. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 23-24 (2d ed. 1970) (one
paradigm becomes superior to others if it solves problems or explains phenomena that other
paradigms cannot solve or explain).
19. See, e.g., David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law
Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1-33 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look At Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1263
(1992); Maureen A. O'Connor, Restructuring The Corporation's Nexus Of Contracts:
Recognizing A Fiduciary Duty To Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1190 (1991);
Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty In The Corporate Enterprise, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 2215 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FICHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996) and ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD
SOCIETY (1991)). For a thorough normative critique of so-called "progressive corporate law"
see Stephen Bainbridge, Community and Statism:A Conservative Contractarian Critique of
Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997) (reviewing
PROGRESSIvE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)).
20. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
21. See KUHN, supra note 18, at 23-24, 109-10 (wide applicability enhances acceptance
of paradigms).
22. See infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text (describing Blair and Stout's use of the
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
scholars apparently agree, and Blair and Stout's thesis has already
spawned a number of articles that employ the mediating hierarch
model to examine a variety of corporate law problems. 21 It would
therefore appear that Blair and Stout have mounted a credible
challenge to the principal-agent model and with it the shareholder
primacy norm.
This Essay offers a critique of Blair and Stout's "team pro-
duction theory of corporate law" and a corresponding defense of the
principal-agent model. As an initial matter, it should be noted that
Blair and Stout's hypothesis is not the only"team production theory
of corporate law." The principal-agent account itself depends upon
the team production theory, resting, as it does, on an assumption
that the corporation is a "nexus of contracts" among various factors
of production. At any rate, Blair and Stout's modified version of the
team production theory suffers from several conceptual weaknesses,
shortcomings that undermine their assertion that a mediating
hierarch model of corporate governance will produce significantly
lower transaction costs than the single-owner approach and
associated shareholder primacy norm.
Blair and Stout concede that states have not adopted a mediating
hierarch approach where private firms like partnerships and closely
held corporations are concerned.24 At the same time, these authors
have offered no evidence or argument that participants in publicly
held enterprises are particularly vulnerable to opportunism.
mediating hierarch model purportedly to explain various supposedly "puzzling" features of
the law of public corporations); see also Margaret M. Blair, A Contractarian Defense Of
Corporate Philanthropy, 28 STETSON L. REV. 27 (1998).
23. Indeed, the Journal of Corporation Law recently devoted an entire issue to
(sympathetic) analysis and application of Blair and Stout's thesis. See Symposium, Team
Production In Business Organizations, 24 J. CORP. L. 743-1037 (1999) (containing eight
different articles applying the mediating hierarch theory to analyze various aspects of
business organizations). Several other scholars have applied Blair and Stout's thesis or felt
it necessary to explain why it does not apply to the particular problem they are addressing.
See, e.g., Eric A. Chiappinelli, The Moral Basis Of State Corporate Law Disclosure, 49 CATH.
U. L. REV. 697, 714-15 (2000); Mae Kuykendall, Assessment And Evaluation: Retheorizing
The Evolving Rules of Director Liability, 8 J.L. & POL. 1, 39-44 (1999); Zenichi Shishido,
Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of Corporate Law and Their
Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 193-95, 215 (2000); see also Kent Greenfield, The Place
Of Workers In Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283,287,293-94, 300-01 (1998) (relying upon
earlier draft of Blair and Stout's paper).
24. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 281-82.
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Relationship-specific investments and the concomitant potential for
opportunism are endemic to economic life and are not confined to
enterprises organized as public corporations. Indeed, certain attri-
butes of public corporations afford participants in such ventures
protections that render them less susceptible to some forms of
opportunism than participants in private ventures, while at the
same time leaving shareholders more vulnerable to such conduct.
Thus, the transaction costs of obtaining team-specific investment
under a single-owner approach would seem to be lower for public
corporations than for other forms of business organization, while
the benefits of protecting shareholders through implementation of
a shareholder primacy norm would be larger where public firms are
concerned.
Of course, the mere fact that the transaction costs of obtaining
specific investment in public firms are lower than similar costs in
private firms does not establish the superiority of a single-owner
approach in either. It may be that a well-functioning mediating
hierarch model would produce lower transaction costs than a single
owner model in both types of firms. Nevertheless, by focusing on the
transaction cost consequences of alternative governance regimes,
Blair and Stout have neglected an additional consideration, namely,
the cost of ownership. By transforming the firm's residual product
into common property and empowering directors to distribute this
property as they see fit, a mediating hierarch approach would
undermine the shareholders' role as the primary monitors of firm
activity and thus severely attenuate the incentives of directors
to maximize anything other than their own welfare. Thus, such an
approach to corporate governance would, if anything, increase the
transaction costs of inducing team-specific investment, while at the
same time attenuating the specialization benefits that would
otherwise result from the separation of ownership from control.
These ownership costs likely explain why, as Blair and Stout con-
cede, states have rejected a mediatinghierarch model of governance
for private firms. A fortiori, one would expect states to reject such
an approach for public firms where the transaction costs of
obtaining team specific investment are relatively low.
Adoption of the shareholder primacy norm does not require
directors "ruthlessly" to pursue immediate shareholder interest at
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every turn, as Blair and Stout assert.25 On the contrary, directors
and managers pursuing shareholder interests will have every
incentive to induce various members of the team to make firm-
specific investment, and thus will take those steps necessary to
provide credible commitments, in the form of contracts or
otherwise, to refrain from opportunism. Firms that ignore such
commitments in the quest for short-term gain will most likely harm
shareholders in the long run by raising the cost of obtaining team-
specific investment in the future. Refusal to pursue opportunistic
business tactics, then, is perfectly consistent with the principal-
agent conception of the public corporation.
Careful analysis of corporate law and the institutional ar-
rangements that support it confirms that Delaware at least has
embraced a single-owner approach to governance of publicly held
corporations. To be sure, Blair and Stout have cited certain attri-
butes of corporate law that, when viewed in the abstract, might
appear inconsistent with the shareholder primacy norm inherent in
the principal-agent model. However, each of these doctrines is
perfectly consistent with the principal-agent model, particularly
when one considers the various market mechanisms that have
evolved to align the interests of shareholders and directors. The
existence of these mechanisms, which take the place of legal
regulation of director conduct by inducing directors to pursue
shareholder interests to the exclusion of others, would itself appear
inconsistent with a mediating hierarch model of firm governance.
Indeed, scholars who espouse the principal-agent view have
applauded many of the attributes of corporate law that Blair and
Stout have invoked.
Moreover, Blair and Stout have misstated some doctrines and
overlooked others that are flatly inconsistent with a mediating
hierarch approach and can only be explained by a principal-agent
conception of the public corporation. Finally, Blair and Stout have
not explained why states have declined to adopt explicitly a
mediating hierarch approach, refusing to mandate control of firms
by disinterested outside directors as many have proposed. While
corporate law allows firms to construct their boards in this manner,
25. Id. at 280.
1636 [Vol. 43:1629
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most have rejected such an approach and reposed practical
authority over firm affairs in the hands of inside directors who are
emphatically not mediating hierarchs. In the end, adoption of a
mediatinghierarch approach to corporate governance would require
Delaware to alter its corporate law in a variety of ways.
Part I of this Essay reviews the traditional principal-agent
conception of the public corporation and summarizes Blair and
Stout's challenge to it. Part II identifies several theoretical flaws in
Blair and Stout's argument, flaws that undermine their assertion
that a mediating hierarch approach to governing the public
corporation is economically superior to a single-owner approach.
Part III rebuts Blair and Stout's descriptive claim that Delaware's
law of public corporations reflects the adoption of a mediating
hierarch model of corporate governance.
BLAIR AND STOUTs CHALLENGE TO THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
As noted earlier, most scholars characterize the modern public
corporation and the laws that create it as an institutional
arrangement that facilitates the separation of ownership from
control. While the traditional business firm unites these two
functions-law firm partners run the firm and bear the associated
risks-the public corporation allows for their separation.
Shareholders contribute capital and bear risk, while managers act
as shareholder agents and direct that capital in what are hopefully
profit-making ventures. Such separation creates the possibility of
significant gains from specialization. Many individuals may have
capital to invest in a business enterprise and at the same time lack
the business acumen necessary to manage such a business. Others
might have such acumen, but nevertheless wish to diversify their
holdings by investing small sums in several different firms, without
committing permanently to participation in any particular enter-
prise. Managers, by contrast, might have significant expertise but
lack the capital necessary to undertake the enterprise in question.
By agreeing to coordinate the utilization of their respective
26. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 1-39; Henry N. Butler, The
Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99 (1989).
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resources through a public corporation, then, shareholders and
managers can place large sums of capital in the hands of specialist
managers and thus realize gains not obtainable by firms in which
ownership and control must be exercised by a single individual or
group of individuals."
While the separation of ownership from control is a necessary
condition for achieving significant gains from specialization, it does
not by itself produce such gains. For separation to produce the
desired results, shareholders must resist the temptation to second-
guess managers, and managers must diligently seek to advance
shareholder interests. By its nature, however, separation creates
the risk that neither of these conditions will be satisfied. Because
they do not share in the profits (or losses) generated by their efforts,
managers may have little incentive to pursue their duties with
diligence.'8 Such shirking could attenuate the gains produced by the
separation of ownership from control, and cause shareholders to
spend resources monitoring managers' actions. This monitoring
could be especially costly, as shareholders spend significant
resources gathering information and exercising day-to-day control
over firm operations. Taken together, these two costs-manager
shirking and shareholder monitoring-constitute the costs of
agency implicit in the separation of ownership from control.29
The law of public corporations, it is said, is designed to facilitate
the separation of ownership from control and the specialization it
implies, while at the same time minimizing agency costs. Managers
run the firm on a daily basis, and shareholders have no power to
27. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 1-24 (1986); EASTERBROOK& FISCHEL, supra
note 4, at 11.
28.
The directors of Ujoint stock] companies, however, being the managers rather
of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they
should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners
in a private co-partnery frequently watch over their own. ... Negligence and
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of
the affairs of such a company.
MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 197 (1995) (quoting ADAM SMITH,
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (Cannan ed., 1937) (1776)) (alteration in the original).
29. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 11; Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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countermand their decisions. Moreover, shareholders can purchase
small stakes that are readily transferable to other purchasers and
are "on the hook" only for their initial investment. Therefore, they
need not fear loss of their individual fortunes should something go
wrong."° At the same time, shareholders employ directors to
oversee managers, and both are duty-bound to deploy the firm's
resources in a manner that maximizes shareholder welfare.
Implicit in this conception of the public corporation is the norm of
shareholder primacy, i.e., that directors and managers should
run the public corporation so as to maximize the residual available
to shareholders."'
Blair and Stout offer an alternative conception of the public
corporation, a conception that draws upon the "team production"
theory of the firm.32 First advanced by Armen Alchian and Harold
Demsetz, the team production theory builds upon Professor Coase's
assertion that the firm is a vehicle for avoiding the costs associated
with market transacting.33 Much economic activity, it is said,
involves production by teams. Because team production involves
joint effort, however, it is often difficult to measure the contribution
of each member of the team to the final product, and thus difficult
to determine how team members should divide the profits
30. EASTERBRooK&FiSCHEL, supra note 4, at 11, 41-44 (discussing link between limited
liability and separation of ownership from control).
31. Id. at 67-70; see also Smith, supra note 7, at 280-83 (describing "contractarian"
support for shareholder primacy norm).
32. See Blair & Stout, supra note 9.
33. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 3, at 777. Professor Coase first articulated the
conventional approach. Coase, supra note 1,passim. Some may be puzzled by the assertion
that the team production theory "builds upon" Coase's work. After all, Alchian and Demsetz
explicitly rejected Coase's assertion that there is a meaningful distinction between the
authority exercised "within" a firm and the authority a finn can exercise by contract. Alchian
& Demsetz, supra note 3, at 777-78; see also Scott E. Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181, 182-83 (1988). Although Alchian and Demsetz certainly disagreed
with Coase's account of what makes a firm a firm, their team production theory ultimately
rests on an assertion that certain forms of transaction costs, notably, the cost of information,
lead individuals to rely upon the institutional device known as a firm to organize production
and distribute the proceeds. This account would seem to fall squarely within the Coasean
tradition. Indeed, Alchian and Demsetz note that there may be other sorts of "policing" costs
that might lead to the formation of firms. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 3, at 785. See
generally Thomas S. Ulen, The CoaseanFirm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301,311-
12 (1993) (describing link between Coase's work and that of Alchian and Demsetz).
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generated by their activity. 4 Theoretically, of course, members
could agree in advance how they will divide the fruits of their joint
product. If such an agreement is reached, however, each team
member will have an incentive to shirk, knowing that most of the
cost of such slacking will be borne by other members of the team."
The creation of a firm, it is said, is one way of enhancing the
benefits of team production given the costs of organizing such
production through ordinary market contracting. By empowering a
monitor to hire, observe, and reward various inputs, the institution
of a firm can facilitate and maximize the value of team production.3"
Theoretically, the monitor could be a disinterested third party, who
directs the team for a fixed compensation. Such an arrangement
would presumably lead to shirking by the monitor, who would have
no incentive to discharge its duties with diligence. 7 This danger can
be averted, however, by assigning the monitor a property right to
the residual fruits of the team's effort, thus creating the appropriate
incentives to run the team so as to maximize its combined product.3 8
According to Alchian and Demsetz, these considerations give rise to
the paradigmatic business firm: An owner, who enters contracts
with employees and other suppliers, sells the output produced by
this team, and pockets the residual. 9
As described thus far, the team production theory of the firm
would seem to bolster the traditional "principal-agent" conception
of the public corporation and, with it, the shareholder primacy
norm.40 Under the principal-agent account, shareholders possess an
exclusive property right to the firm's residual product and thus
34. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 3, at 779-80.
35. Id. at 780.
36. Id. at 781-83.
37. Id. at 782 (asking "But who will monitor the monitor?").
38. Id. at 782-83.
39. Id. at 794:
The essence of the classical firm is identified here as a contractual structure
with: 1) joint input production; 2) several input owners; 3) one party who is
common to all the contracts of the joint inputs; 4) who has rights to renegotiate
any input's contract independently of contracts with other input owners; 5) who
holds the residual claim; and 6) who has the right to sell his central contractual
residual status.
40. See EASTERBROOK&FISCHEL,supra note 4, at 9-11 (describingcorporations and other
firms as teams of individuals prone to shirking).
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possess incentives to monitor performance of the team.41 Because
they are in a position to transact with various team members,
shareholders internalize the costs and benefits of the firm's actions,
and thus possess incentives to maximize the value of the team's
production.42 Shareholders do not transact or engage in such
monitoring themselves, but instead employ specialized agents-
managers and directors-to do so on their behalf.4" This special-
ization, in turn, gives rise to a separation of ownership from
control-a separation that creates the risk that the agent (manager
or director) will discharge its responsibilities in a manner
inconsistent with the interests of the principal. Indeed, leading
proponents of the principal-agent approach consistently refer to the
public corporation as a "nexus of contracts" between a central
contracting agent and various factors of production, and often
characterize the corporation as a device for maximizing the gains
from team production.44 The principal-agent conception is as much
a "team production theory" as Blair and Stout's proposal.
Nevertheless, Blair and Stout reject the principal-agent
conception of the public corporation by modifying and extending the
team production theory. As they point out, team production often
requires individuals to make team-specific investments-that is,
41. See HAROLD DEMSETZ, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND THE FIRM 231 (1988) (noting that
the ability of shareholders to amass large blocks facilitates monitoring of management and
that "collectively owned assets ... do not offer a practical substitute for a large private and
personal equity stake"); Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 3, at 787-88.
42. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 3, at 787-88; see also Ronald Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities and the
Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 556-57 (1993).
43. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 3, at 788.
44. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 8-11 (articulating "nexus of contracts"
conception of firms generally and public corporations in particular); id. at 10 ("[W]e have
been describing the firm as an extra-market, team method of production ... [clorporations
are a subset offirms."); id. at 172-73 (arguing that potential bidders for firm's shares serve
as monitors of management teams); Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of
Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON. 179 (1985) (characterizing the
corporation as a "nexus of contracts"); Butler, supra note 26, at 103-10 (relying in part on
team production theory to derive and bolster nexus of contracts conception of the
corporation); see also William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A
Critical Appraisal, 74 CoRNELL L. REv. 407, 415-17 (1989) (stating that the "nexus of
contracts" approach is built on the team production theory); Thomas Ulen, The Coasean Firm
in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 319-20 (1993) (showing that"nexus of contracts"
conception of corporation derives from "team production" theory).
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investments that are most useful when used in conjunction with the
activities of the team.45 So, for instance, an employee might invest
in significant training or effort that develops talents that are only
useful, or most useful, to a particular firm. Because team members
cannot take such investments elsewhere, they face the riskthat
other team members, particularly the residual claimant(s), will
exploit them by appropriating the gains of such investments to
themselves.4 A salesperson, for instance, may spend decades
cultivating particular customers for her firm, expecting a high wage
that reflects the cost of these efforts and their value to the
company.47 Once these efforts have been made, however, residual
claimants could capture the gains created by terminating the
salesperson and transferring her customers to a newly hired (and
lower paid) successor.4' To be sure, various team members could
protect themselves against such opportunism by contract, refusing
to join the team or demanding higher wages from those owners that
do not provide credible guarantees against opportunism. These
guarantees could take several forms, including detailed contracts
or "hostages" that deter opportunism. 9 According to Blair and
Stout, however, such arrangements are costly to negotiate and
enforce, and they can reduce the sort of flexibility necessary to the
long-term health of a complex enterprise. 50
Society, then, faces a problem. Efficient wealth creation requires
team production, production that is organized by firms and often
involves team-specific investment by several constituencies such as
creditors, employees, shareholders, and communities. If these firms
adopt a "single-owner" model of governance, the possibility of
opportunism by residual claimants may make potential members
45. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 272-73.
46. Id. at 272-74.
47. Id. at 276 ("The marketing specialist, for example, must develop specialized
knowledge and personal contacts (firm-specific human capital) whose value is vulnerable to
actions and decisions of the team as a whole .... ").
48. HANSMANN, supra note 4, at 26 (describing problem of opportunism directed at
employees who have made team-specific investments).
49. E.g., WILIJAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 169-89 (describing how
firms can create credible commitments against opportunism by giving a hostage). For
instance, a corporation could make investments that are specific to a particular location as
a means of committing not to move elsewhere.
50. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 273.
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reluctant to join the team, if joining requires them to make
investments specific to the relationship. Such reluctance in turn
will increase the costs of obtaining team-specific investment
through market contracting, that is, transaction costs.51 Effective
team production would seem to require some mechanism of
governance that obviates the risk of opportunism inherent in the
single-owner model of the business firm.
As Blair and Stout see things, the public corporation is just
such an institutional arrangement. Like other types of business
enterprise, the public corporation involves the coordination of a
variety of inputs: capital, labor, and management. According to
Blair and Stout, however, the public corporation differs from other
enterprises in one crucial respect: it lacks a single owner, i.e., a
residual claimant that can control the enterprise for its exclusive
benefit. Sole proprietorships, partnerships, and closely held
corporations all possess identifiable owners, who exercise control
over the enterprise and can assert an exclusive property right over
its profits.52 The public corporation, on the other hand, is owned by
no particular individual or group: various groups make team-
specific investments and thus can claim entitlement to a portion of
the residual benefits of the team's activity.53
Although nominally subject to election by common shareholders,
directors of public corporations are, as a practical matter, ac-
ountable to no one.54 Because shareholders possess no particular
property right in the firm's product, the directors of such a firm are
in a position to act as neutral hierarchs, mediating the competing
claims that various team members might have to the collective
residual benefits of the team's activities. In so doing, they can
pursue policies that maximize the joint welfare of the team, and
not merely the welfare of a single constituency, such as the
shareholders.55 As a result, firms will be able to make a credible
51. Cf. WILLIAISON, ECONOMIc INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 20-22 (defining
"transaction cost" as any cost that results from reliance upon markets instead of"directing"
economic activity within firms); Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J. L. &
ECON. 141, 144-47 (1979) (same).
52. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 275, 281.
53. Id. at 275-87.
54. Id. at 310-11.
55. Id. at 277-78.
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commitment to refrain from exploiting individuals who have made
team-specific investments." Knowing that the hierarch will not
"ruthlessly pursue shareholders' interests at the expense of
employees, creditors, or other team members,"57 potential team
members will be more willing to make the sort of relationship-
specific investments that can maximize the value of team
production.58 Thus, the cost of obtaining such investments by
market contracting-transaction costs-will be lower than the costs
that would afflict a firm that pursued a single-owner approach.59
The law of public corporations, then, provides a mediating hierarch
system of governance and thus minimizes transaction costs for
those enterprises that involve the sort of team-specific investment
that renders constituents vulnerable to opportunism.' Indeed, Blair
and Stout's thesis is distinguished more by its reliance on the
mediating hierarch system of governance than the team production
theory as such.6'
Because Blair and Stout would discard the norm of shareholder
primacy, some may associate their argument with "progressive"
calls for corporate social responsibility, i.e., the sacrifice by
corporations of efficiency and shareholder profits in furtherance of
other concerns.62 Blair and Stout, however, expressly disassociate
themselves from the progressive movement, and with good reason.63
Like many proponents of the principal-agent conception and related
shareholder primacy norm, Blair and Stout assume that a
corporation is usefully characterized as a "nexus of contracts" and
that states do and should craft corporate law so as to maximize
56. Cf WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 167-89 (arguing that
ability to make a credible commitment to refrain from opportunism can reduce the
transaction costs of obtaining relationship-specific investment).
57. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 280.
58. Id. at 276-80.
59. Id. at 271-82.
60. Id. at 275-78.
61. Cf id. at 319-28 (repeatedly referring to their "mediating hierarchy model of firm
governance); see also supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (showing that principal-agent
account is also a team production theory).
62. See, e.g., PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); David
Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991).
63. See Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 253-54.
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social wealth.6 4 To be sure, the mediating hierarch conception of the
public corporation may produce results that might seem more "fair"
and "just" to some than the results produced by a shareholder
primacy model. To Blair and Stout, however, this attribute is purely
incidental. As they see things, states have adopted the mediating
hierarch conception of the public corporation for hard-headed
reasons of efficiency. More precisely, states have embraced the
mediating hierarch concept because it is superior to competing
institutional arrangements for certain classes of enterprises,
namely, those that require production by teams of individuals that
must make relationship-specific investments that enhance the risk
of opportunism.6"
THE PROHIBITIVE COSTS OF A MEDIATING HIERARCH GOVERNANCE
MODEL
Blair and Stout assert that a mediating hierarch approach to
governing public corporations will minimize the transaction costs
associated with the team-specific investment that distinguishes
such enterprises from those that employ a single-owner model and
thus maximize social welfare. As shown below, Blair and Stout's
theoretical argument falls short for two different reasons. First,
these scholars have failed to show that opportunism induced by
team-specific investment is more prevalent in publicly held firms
than in private enterprises organized along a single-owner model.
Team-specific investment is endemic to economic life and is in no
way limited to the sort of large-scale enterprises that tend to
organize as public corporations. Indeed, certain inherent attributes
of publicly held corporations actually reduce the risk of oppor-
tunism faced by some constituencies and increase the risk faced by
shareholders. Thus, one would expect the transaction costs of
inducing team-specific investments bynonshareholder constituents
to be lower for public corporations organized along a principal-agent
model than for private firms. One would also expect the transaction
costs of obtaining shareholder investment to be higher in public
64. Id. at 254.
65. Id. at 276-87; id. at 287-315 (arguing that Delaware law in fact reflects a mediating
hierarch approach).
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corporations that depart from the shareholder primacy norm than
in similar private firms. These results seem to undermine any
assertion that public corporations should employ a governance
model different from that employed by single-owner private firms.
Second, even if a mediating hierarch model of firm governance
could theoretically produce lower transaction costs than a single-
owner approach, adoption of such a model would entail significant
"ownership costs." By divesting shareholders of any property right
in the firm's residual, such an approach would deprive directors of
any incentives to maximize the welfare of teams or to refrain from
opportunism. As a result, firms would lack the ability to make the
sort of credible commitment necessary to attract team-specific
investment. Moreover, mediating hierarchs would have little
incentive to maximize anything aside from their own welfare, thus
depriving society of the specialization benefits ordinarily associated
with adoption of the corporate form. These ownership costs would
afflict all corporate decision making and thus outweigh any
marginal gains that a mediating hierarch approach might otherwise
produce.
A. Transaction Costs
As noted earlier, conventional wisdom holds that the public
corporation is a business form designed to facilitate realization of
the specialization benefits produced by the separation of ownership
from control.6" In particular, the corporate form allows an
enterprise to aggregate capital from innumerable contributors and
place that capital in the hands of specialized management.
Moreover, common sense and economic theory suggest that these
specialization benefits will be the greatest where the enterprise
in question requires large amounts of capital that no entrepreneur
or group of entrepreneurs can supply. Thus, scholars have tradi-
tionally associated adoption of the corporate form with technological
advances that increased the minimum efficient scale in many
industries previously dominated by smaller, privately held firms.68
66. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
68. See CLAMK supra note 27, at 2-3 (describing efficiency rationales for growth in
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Blair and Stout do not challenge this traditional account of the
rationale for the corporate form of organization; nor could they-no
one can dispute that the average publicly held corporation has a
larger capitalization and operates at a larger scale than the average
proprietorship, partnership, or closelyheld corporation. 9 Moreover,
their modification of the team production theory does not purport
to explain certain central features of the public corporation, namely,
wide dispersion of share ownership and delegation of control to
specialist managers with no stake in the firm. Instead, Blair and
Stout's account is apparently designed merely to supplement the
traditional explanation, while at the same time suggestingrejection
of the shareholder primacy norm for such firms. Indeed, they
expressly state that a desire to attract specific investment "in part"
explains the decision to conduct an enterprise as a public
corporation, thus seeming to concede that there can be other
(partial) explanations as well.70
Although they acknowledge that team production concerns can
provide only a partial explanation for a firm's decision to "go
public," Blair and Stout assert that such firms necessarily opt into
a mandatory mediating hierarch model of firm governance." At the
same time, Blair and Stout concede that sole proprietorships,
partnerships, closely held corporations, and the like do not reflect
a mediating hierarch approach to firm governance but instead are
optimal firm size and associated rise of publicly held corporations); WILLAMSON, ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 273-89; Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory ofProperty Rights,
57 Ali. ECON. REV. 347, 358 (1967). Demsetz notes that:
[Slignificant economies of scale in the operation of large corporations is a fact
and ... large requirements for equity capital can be satisfied more cheaply by
acquiring the capital from many purchasers of equity shares. While economies
of scale in operating these enterprises exist, economies of scale in the provision
of capital do not. Hence, it becomes desirable for many"owners" to form ajoint-
stock company.
Id.
69. See CLARK, supra note 27, at 1-2.
70. See Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 281 (stating that "the choice to 'go public' may be
driven in part by team production considerations") (emphasis added).
71. See id. at 309 (suggesting that firms can opt out of mediating hierarch model by going
private); cf Jonathan Macey, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance A Contractual
Perspective, 18 J. CORP. L. 185,186-87 (1993) (discussing distinction between mandatory and
so-called "enabling" rules).
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characterized by single-owner approaches.72 In other words, Blair
and Stout assert that the same states that have sought to maximize
wealth by embracing a mediating hierarch structure for publicly
held corporations have adopted a single-owner approach for other
firms. Thus, Blair and Stout's argument depends upon a critical
assumption, namely, that enterprises that, for whatever reason,
choose to organize as public corporations generally entail team-
specific investments and a resulting risk of opportunism greater
than that found in private firms.
The assumption that private firms proceed on a single-owner
model seems irrebuttable: New York's law of partnership does not
require the partners at Wall Street law firms to mediate between
competing claims by associates and creditors to the firms' residuals.
Blair and Stout therefore bear some burden of proving that, in fact,
opportunism is more prevalent in larger enterprises of the sort that
organize themselves as public corporations. Failure to carry this
burden, it seems, would undermine any assertion that special risks
of opportunism require departure from the single-owner approach
where public corporations are concerned.
As shown below, there is no reason to believe that participants in
enterprises organized as public corporations face special risks of
opportunism. First, Blair and Stout adduce no evidence that firms
that choose to organize as public corporations involve more specific
investment than partnerships, closely held corporations, and the
like; indeed, casual empiricism suggests otherwise. Second, even if
publicly held firms do involve a disproportionate amount of team-
specific investment, such firms by their nature share various
attributes that render employees and creditors less vulnerable to
opportunism than their counterparts in privately held firms.
Moreover, shareholders of publicly held firms will be subject to a
greater risk of opportunism than the owners of private companies.
These attributes, it should be emphasized, are independent of
governance structure and are instead a function of various inherent
characteristics of publicly held firms: large scale, perpetual life, and
dispersion of share ownership. Thus, the case for adopting a
mediating hierarch approach to firm governance is actually weaker
72. See Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 273-76.
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where the public corporation is concerned than it is with respect to
smaller, private companies. If a single-owner approach is efficient
for private firms, it would seem to follow that it is efficient for
public firms as well.
As noted above, Blair and Stout do attempt to explain why states
have not embraced the mediating hierarch model for partnerships,
closely held corporations, and the like. Participants in such
firms, they suggest, do not face the same threat of debilitating
opportunism that might be present in public corporations. In
particular, Blair and Stout assert that, in private firms, only one
individual or group's investment may be specific to the success of
the enterprise, with the result that other groups are not susceptible
to exploitation.73 These enterprises, they say, can mitigate the
possibility of opportunism by assigning an exclusive property right
in the firm's profits to the constituency that would otherwise be
vulnerable to such conduct.74 Moreover, in those instances where
several participants in private firms do make team-specific
investments, nonowners can purportedly protect themselves against
opportunism through market contracting.75 These enterprises, then,
can organize as single-owner firms without significantly hampering
their ability to attract firm-specific investments.76
Blair and Stout, however, offer no empirical evidence that the
sort of enterprises organized as private firms in fact involve less
team-specific investment than those organized as public corpo-
rations. Nor do they offer any theoretical argument suggesting a
correlation between factors that lead firms to "go public" and the
risk of opportunism. Finally, they do not explain why participants
in smaller firms are better able to protect themselves against
opportunism via market contracting. Thus, their argument seems
to boil down to an assertion that, because a mediating hierarch
approach to corporate governance is a superior method of attracting
73. Id. at 281-82.
74. Id at 281; see also id. at 273-76; cf HANSMANN, supra note 4, at 53-56 (explaining
that investor-owned firns minimize the costs of opportunism by assigning sole ownership
rights to suppliers of financial capital).
75. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 282 (stating that enterprises not organized as public
corporations may face "relatively few obstacles to explicit contracting over the division of any
surplus").
76. See id. at 281-82.
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and coordinating team-specific investment, then it must be
empirically true that participants in enterprises organized as
single-owner firms are less susceptible to opportunism."
There is good reason to doubt this claim. Economic activity
performed by nonpublic firms routinely requires several
constituencies to make firm-specific investments, and explicit
contracts can be imperfect methods of preventing opportunism.7"
Indeed, Professor Alchian, on whose "team production" theory Blair
and Stout rely, has argued that all firms consist of a coalition of
various input owners that have made investments specific to
resources owned by other members of the coalition.79 Casual
empiricism confirms Professor Alchian's assertion. For instance,
numerous closely held corporations exist among the nation's larger
business enterprises, and these firms undoubtedly involve
significant team-specific investment by numerous constituencies. 0
Or, consider a medium-sized law firm that specializes in litigation.
One team member-the rainmaker--convinces the client to use the
firm's services. Another-a senior litigation partner-takes on the
responsibility for the case. A pretrial brief is required, in support of
a motion for summary judgment. The senior partner assigns this
task to a senior associate. The senior associate, in turn, seeks a
research memo from a mid-level associate before she drafts the
brief. Once drafted, the brief is reviewed by the senior litigation
partner, who signs it on the firm's behalf.
This, of course, is classic team production: if the client prevails,
it is very difficult to value the respective contributions of each
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 52-56 (explaining
that relationship-specific investments are necessary for risk of opportunism to be present);
Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521
(1981); Oliver Williamson, Technology and Transaction Cost Economics, 10 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 355 (1988) (articulating -rebuttable presumption that firm boundaries and
characteristics are determined by risk of opportunism and associated transaction cost
considerations).
79. Armen A. Alchian, Specificity, Specialization, and Coalitions, 140 J. INST. &
THEORETICAL ECON. 34, 36-40 (1984).
80. Large closely held corporations include Cargill, Amway, Hallmark Cards, Enterprise
Rent-A-Car, Koch Enterprises, and S & P Co., which manufactures Pabst, Old Milwaukee,
Schlitz, Old Style, and Lone Star beers. These firms are all major participants in their
respective industries. There is no reason to suspect that they involve less team-specific
investment than their publicly held competitors.
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member of the litigation team."1 Moreover, each member of the
team has made investments in human capital that are specific to
the case, as well as investments specific to the firm. The rainmaker,
for instance, has spent several years cultivating clients that are
"just right" for the sort of expertise offered by the firm. 2 The
litigation partner has developed talents useful to the sort of cases
these clients might face. The senior associate has spent seven years
cultivating relationships within the firm and learning how to
generate business outside of it. The mid-level associate has recently
moved to the area and purchased a house in the suburbs. Each of
these individuals is theoretically susceptible to opportunism by
others in the firm. Senior associates orjunior partners, for instance,
may "grab" the rainmaker's clients and leave the firm. 3 Partners
may refuse to promote or even fire associates, thus depriving them
of anticipated deferred compensation. 4 It does not appear possible
to devise explicit contracts that entirely eliminate such behavior."
Moreover, it does not appear that the type or degree of such
opportunism is any different from the sort of opportunism that
may beset, say, a multinational automobile manufacturer. Still,
small and medium-sized law firms are not organized as public
81. See Fred S. McChesney, Team Production, Monitoring, and Profit Sharing in Law
Firms: An Alternative Hypothesis, 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 379 (1982) (using team production
theory to explain structure and conduct of law firm partnerships).
82. See Marc S. Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Large Law Firm Misery: It's the
Tournament, Not the Money, 52 VAND. L. REV. 953,960 (1999); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H.
Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: The Economics of Associate Career
Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV. 567, 577-78 (1989).
83. See Galanter & Palay, supra note 82, at 959-60 (discussing this form of opportunism);
Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 82, at 573.
84. Galanter & Palay, supra note 82, at 960; Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 82, at 577-78.
85. Law firm associates, for instance, almost always workpursuant to "atwill" contracts,
thus suggesting that contractual protection against opportunism is not practicable. Of course,
contract law is not the only mechanism that can protect employees from opportunism. A law
firm that exercises its power of termination arbitrarily will suffer reputational losses, thus
making it more difficult to hire associates in the future. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense
of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Ci. L. REV. 947, 967-68 (1984). The same is true, however, for
a public corporation. Id. at 968 (suggesting that larger corporations suffer greater
reputational losses from arbitrary dismissals than smaller firms). Thus, there is no reason
to believe that employees of public corporations are particularly subject to opportunism.
On the other hand, it would seem that firms could draft contracts that in some cases
prevent departing associates from taking clients with them, so long as such agreements are
limited in scope and duration. In the same way, of course, a public corporation could contract
with its salespersons so as to prevent them from taking the firm's customers to a competitor.
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corporations, and Blair and Stout concede that states have
rejected the mediating hierarch model for these businesses in
favor of a single-owner approach. Such firms do induce team-
specific investment, without constituting their managing partners
as mediating hierarchs. To be sure, inducing such investment is not
costless; the risk of opportunism does produce some transaction
costs. Still, the risk of opportunism and the transaction costs that
result are not exogenous, but are instead a function of various legal
rules and contractual arrangements that have evolved to minimize
those costs.8 By relying on these mechanisms, firms are able to
attract significant specific investment.
Similar reasoning suggests that team-specific investments in
financial capital are equally prevalent in public and private firms.
There is no doubt that creditors who loan money to publicly held
corporations thereby make a team-specific investment; if the firm
fails, a creditor will not be able to take its investment elsewhere.
As a result, such creditors necessarily incur a risk of exploitation
by owners who may, for instance, make unnecessarily risky
investments. The very same is true, however, for those who loan
money to partnerships or closely held corporations. Whether the
"team" is Exxon-Mobil or the local auto repair shop, those who loan
money to the enterprise are thereby "locked in" and will be left
"holding the bag" if risky investments lead to bankruptcy.
Indeed, it would appear that participation in smaller enterprises
routinely organized as partnerships or closely held corporations
would pose a greater risk of opportunism to some constituents than
would participation in a single-owner enterprise with the attributes
of a public corporation. Consider, for instance, the plight of
creditors. According to Blair and Stout, creditors in publicly held
86. Cf RONALD H. COASE, THE FiRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 27-28 (1988) (arguing
that background legal rules can affect the cost of transacting); Ronald H. Coase, The
Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 717-18 (1992) (same); see also
Alan J. Meese, Regulation of Franchisor Opportunism and Production of the Institutional
Framework: Federal Monopoly or Competition Between the States?, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y, 61, 70-77 (1999) (showing that various doctrines of contract law can reduce the
transaction costs associated with opportunism in the franchising context).
87. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 304 ("However described,
suppliers of finance bear a unique relation to the firm: The whole of their investment in the
firm is potentially placed at hazard."); Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 276, n.61.
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corporations are more susceptible to opportunism than those in
smaller, privately held firms. This assertion appears to be incorrect.
Firms that sell debt in public markets are subject to disclosure
requirements not applicable to firms that obtain credit privately.
88
Moreover, firms that participate in national capital markets are
scrutinized carefully by sophisticated market analysts who provide
low-cost information to institutions and individuals that buy and
hold debt securities.89 Publicly held corporations have a perpetual
existence and borrow from repeat players, and those that attempt
to exploit creditors by, for instance, pursuing unduly risky business
strategies will see the price of their debt fall and find it difficult to
sell such debt in the future.90 Smaller private firms, on the other
hand, may have little reputational capital at stake; these firms can
exploit one set of creditors without alerting potential future
creditors to the firm's bad faith.9 Thus, it would seem that creditors
88. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 172 (3d
ed. 1995) (describing application of federal securities laws to debt securities).
89. MarkE.VanDerWeide,AgainstFiduciaryDuties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21DEL.
J. CORP. L. 27, 48 (1996) ("Information intermediaries (underwriters and bond rating
agencies) vouch for the existence and effectiveness of terms in bond indentures.").
90. See Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the
Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 Duke L.J. 173, 182 (noting that
firms that appear likely to engage in risky conduct will pay a premium to bond purchasers);
Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413,434 (1986);
Van Der Weide, supra note 89, at 45 ("Creditors avoid firms with a reputation for abusing
debtholders.").
91. See J. Mark Ramseyer, Legal Rules In Repeated Deals: Banking In the Shadow of
Defection in Japan, 20 J. LEG. STUD. 91, 96-97 (1991) (arguing that small debtors may lack
the sort of reputation necessary to assure performance); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and
Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387,1451-52 (1983) (showing that a firm that lends to one-
time unsophisticated customers will be able to obtain unduly advantageous credit terms); cf
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 475-76 (1992) (asserting
that manufacturer of durable goods could pursue strategy of opportunism against recent
customers without jeopardizing future sales if information costs prevent future purchasers
from recognizing possibility of opportunism); Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and
the Quasi.Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & ECON. 461, 485 (1974) (suggesting that discrimination
between sophisticated and unsophisticated customers can facilitate opportunism and lead
to "lemons" equilibrium in contractual terms). But see WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS,
supra note 3, at 305 (noting that firms that obtain credit from friends or family can apply
informal sanctions not available to larger firms). Nevertheless, Professor Williamson
ultimately concludes that creditors of publicly held firms can protect themselves from
opportunism by contract.
One could argue that such exploitation would be less prevalent for closely held
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of publicly held firms are in many cases less susceptible to
opportunism than those who loan money to private firms.
Of course, market-based incentives may not always prevent the
residual claimants of a public corporation from exploiting creditors.
Like smaller firms, publicly held firms sometimes find themselves
in the final period, despite their potential perpetual existence.
Moreover, one could argue that some market-based mechanisms are
endogenous, i.e., arise to combat the threat of opportunism, even if
such mechanisms are reinforced by certain inherent attributes of
the publicly held firm.92 If so, the existence of such mechanisms
does not necessarily suggest that creditors are invulnerable to such
conduct. Yet, creditors of publicly held firms have another method
of protecting themselves from opportunism, a method that may not
be practically available to creditors of smaller firms,, namely,
market contracting. Unlike smaller firms, which raise debt capital
from friends, families, or perhaps local banks, publicly held
firms usually sell debt to underwriters, who can in turn sell to
sophisticated investors or institutions." Given the size of such
offerings, these creditors can rationally invest significant resources
in anticipating various contingencies and drafting bond covenants
to protect against them.94 Far from making contractual protection
corporations than for, say, partnerships, as the former have perpetual life. Nevertheless, one
suspects that the average life of a publicly traded firm is longer than that of a closely held
one, with the result that the desire to protect firm reputation will deter opportunism more
completely where public corporations are concerned.
92. See infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text (suggesting that some market
mechanisms that reduce agency costs are endogenous to the threat of opportunism against
shareholders); HANSMANN, supra note 4, at 60 (suggesting that"a key role in keeping agency
costs of dispersed shareholdings to a reasonable level is played by the various
institutions-public and private, formal and informal-that have arisen inthe United States
to enforce the fiduciary duties of managers toward their shareholders") (emphasis added).
93. Seegenerally THOMASLEEHAZEN, THELAWOFSECURITIEsREGULATiON 72-78(1996)
(describing underwriting process).
94. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
601-04 (4th ed. 1991) (describing various restrictive covenants often found in bond
covenants); Macey, supra note 71, at 195-96 (arguing that shareholders have found it in their
interests to draft covenants that protect bondholders because such covenants can "increase
the overall value of the firn by lowering the cost of raising capital from fixed claimants");
Van Der Weide, supra note 89, at 45-49; see also Northwestern Natl Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916
F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990) (arguing that mass-produced form contracts "enable enormous
savings in transaction costs"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a (1981)
(same).
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more difficult, then, the sheer scale of the modern publicly held
corporation actually facilitates reliance on market contracting by
creditors. To be sure, market contracting is never a costless
response to the possibility of opportunism, and this context is no
exception. Still, such contracting will be less imperfect where
publicly held firms are involved.
Creditors are not the only constituency that will be less
vulnerable to opportunism when trading with publicly held
corporations: employees, it seems, will often fare better when
dealing with such firms. Unlike partnerships or sole propri-
etorships, for instance, many such firms have national, perpetual
reputations developed for marketing purposes. Such reputations
function as a sort of performance bond that deters opportunism."
An automotive company named "Ford" that treats its Detroit
employees poorly may find itself subject to a formal or informal
consumer boycott; it will certainly find it more difficult to hire new
employees anywhere in the country.96 A smaller, privately held firm
with little reputational capital can abuse its employees in Detroit
and then expand to new markets without penalty. Thus,
employees who make team-specific investments with publicly held
firms will have some assurance against opportunism that
employees of smaller firms will lack.
Such reputation-based market mechanisms do not always deter
opportunism. A large, publicly traded firm may treat its employees
poorly despite the negative reputational effects that result.
Employees who believe themselves vulnerable to such opportunism
are not without recourse, however. Like creditors, they may protect
themselves via market contracting. Of course, individuals who work
for smaller firms may find the cost of negotiating and enforcing
such agreements prohibitive. The law, however, has altered the
institutional framework in a way that facilitates the sort of market
contracting that can deter opportunism. For instance, common law
95. Epstein, supra note 85, at 967-68; see also Benjamin Klein & Keith Leffler, The Role
of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 618-25 (1981)
(arguing that reputation can serve as a performance bond that deters opportunism).
96. Inrecentmemory, several major firms, including Coors, Texaco, and Coca-Cola, have
suffered in the marketplace as a result of purportedly unfair employment practices.
97. Cf. Ramseyer, supra note 91, at 96-97 (suggesting that small firms with little
reputational capital can behave opportunistically without suffering a market sanction).
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background rules facilitate the negotiation and enforcement of
standard employment contracts, thus reducing the transaction costs
associated with the risk of opportunism. 9 Moreover, the institution
of collective bargaining can attenuate such costs. By empowering an
agent to write and enforce one contract on behalf of thousands of
workers, unionization can spread the fixed costs of negotiation and
enforcement, thus making market contracting a more meaningful
option for some employees.99 To be sure, not all publicly held firms
are unionized. Still, given the fixed costs of organizing a bargaining
unit, larger firms are far more likely to be organized than smaller
ones. Moreover, the absence of unionization may in some cases
indicate that employees do not think themselves vulnerable to
opportunism.'00 While collective bargaining or other forms of
standard contracting will not deter all opportunism directed at
employees, these mechanisms will deter some such behavior,
particularly that directed at employees of large, publicly held firms.
Such mechanisms, supported by contract law and other background
98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981) (allowing enforcement of
form contracts if terms are within reasonable expectations of the parties); Coase, supra note
86, at 717-18 (explaining that a state can lower transaction costs by altering the institutional
framework); Meese, supra note 86, at 71-73 (arguing that section 211 and related doctrines
can reduce the costs of precontractual opportunism); id. at 74-77 (arguing that good faith
covenant implied in all contracts can reduce the costs of post-contractual opportunism).
99. Eugene Fama,Agency Problems and the Theory ofthe Firm, 88 J.POL. ECON. 288,294
(1980) (concluding that labor representation on boards may not be necessary because "there
may be other market-induced institutions, for example, unions, that more effectively monitor
managers on behalf of specific factors"); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ. 297,315 (1978)
("When... employees maybe opportunistically appropriated by the firm, implicit and explicit
long-term contracts are also used to prevent such behavior. Because of economies of scale in
monitoring and enforcing such contracts, unions may arise as a contract cost-reducing
institution for employees with investments in specific human capital."); Douglas L. Leslie,
Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353,356-57 (1984) (arguing that unions can achieve
collective goods for their members, including detailed employment contracts, that individuals
would not rationally negotiate on their own); see also WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITIrONS,
supra note 3, at 313 (arguing that employees do not need representation on a public
corporation's board of directors because they can rely on collective bargaining to devise
governance structures that minimize the costs of opportunism); Macey, supra note 90, at 192
(stating that employees can thwart opportunism via collective bargaining).
100. See J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment
Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 892-93 (arguing that
workers with little taste for contractual protection may self-select away from unionized
firms).
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rules, make up an institutional framework that obviates the
necessity of altering corporate law to provide for a mediating
hierarch model of governance.1 '
It should be noted that there is one constituency that may face a
greater risk of opportunism in publicly held firms, namely,
shareholders. As noted earlier, the defining characteristic of the
publicly held corporation is the relative dispersion of equityholders.
Unlike law firm partners, for instance, who are in a position to
monitor their associate-employees (and fellow partners) seven
days per week, those who supply general-use capital to public
corporations cannot practicably oversee the activities of the
managers who employ their capital, and thus face a special risk of
opportunism. Moreover, unlike partners in a law firm, each of
whom can take a portion of their (human) capital elsewhere,
shareholders' entire investments are perpetually locked into
the firm, and thus especially vulnerable to opportunism. 10 2
Finally, market contracting will fall far short as a means of
protecting shareholders against opportunism. 03 As a result, Oliver
101. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (legal rules create a framework that can
lower transaction costs).
102. To be sure, any single shareholder can sell his or her shares at any time, thus
recovering aportion ofthe investment. Nevertheless, ifopportunisminduces all shareholders
to sell their stock simultaneously, share prices will plummet. Thus, because opportunism in
this context involves behavior that inflicts harm on shareholders as a class, shareholders are
effectively locked into their investments. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note
3, at 304 ("Although a well-developed market in shares permits individual stockholders to
terminate ownership easily by selling their shares, it does not follow that stockholders as a
group have a limited stake in the firm. What is available to individual stockholders may be
unavailable to stockholders in the aggregate."); see also HANSMANN, supra note 4, at 56
(individuals who supply long-term capital to a firm are thereby "locked-in" and vulnerable
to opportunism).
103. See HANSMANN, supra note 4, at 55; WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra
note 3, at 305 ("Stockholders are also unique in that their investments are not associated
with particular assets. The diffuse character of their investments puts shareholders at an
enormous disadvantage in crafting the kind of bilateral safeguards [necessary to deter
opportunism]. Given the enormous variety, the usual strictures of comprehensive ex ante
contracting apply here in superlative degree."); see also HANSMANN, supra note 4, at 12
(arguing that those who hold residual claims cannot exercise control over agents by contract
because "the essence of what we term control is precisely the authority to determine those
aspects of firm policy that, because of high [bargaining] costs or imperfect foresight cannot
be specified ex ante in a contract but must be left to the discretion of those to whom authority
is granted"); Van Der Weide, supra note 89, at 36 ("[Iln order for shareholders to safeguard
their investment, they must maintain positive control over a panoply of corporate decisions.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Williamson, the leading exponent of transaction cost economics, has
concluded that shareholders in publicly held firms "bear a unique
relation to the firm"10' that renders them more vulnerable to
opportunism than any other constituency."15 According to Professor
Williamson, then, the law of public corporations can minimize
transaction costs by adopting a single-owner approach, allowing
nonshareholder constituencies to rely on market mechanisms or
explicit contracting for protection against opportunism. 06
Blair and Stout do not mention Professor Williamson's argument,
and thus make no attempt to rebut it. 07 Instead, they suggest that
shareholders will face a lower risk of opportunism under a
mediating hierarch model of firm governance than under a single-
owner approach.10l This assertion, however, is difficult to accept.
Directors who act as mediating hierarchs will have no more
authority over nonshareholder constituencies than directors who
act as shareholder agents. As a result, they would be no better able
to protect shareholders from opportunism than would directors of
a single-owner firm. If, for instance, a union opportunistically seeks
increased wages by threatening strikes against strategic plants,
mediating hierarchs could do nothing in response except, perhaps,
give in. Ford's Board of Directors cannot order members of the
United Auto Workers back to work, even if corporate law treats
these directors as mediating hierarchs. Adoption of a mediating
hierarch model, then, will not protect shareholders from
opportunism.
The assertion that shareholders of publicly held corporations face
a special risk of opportunism that in part justifies the shareholder
The vast number of relevant contingencies renders contracting impossible.").
104. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 304.
105. See HANSMANN, supra note 4, at 56; WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra
note 3, at 304.
106. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 302-11; see also
HANSMANN, supra note 4, at 21 (noting that"all other things equal, costs will be minimized
if ownership is assigned to the class of patrons for whom the problems of market
contracting-that is, the costs of market imperfections-are most severe").
107. I do not mean to suggest that Blair and Stout have ignored Professor Williamson's
work. To the contrary, they rely on other arguments made by Professor Williamson in the
same book. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 279, n.70 (citing WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 249).
108. See id. at 275-79.
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primacy norm may seem inconsistent with the argument, often
made by proponents of the principal-agent account, that various
market mechanisms align the interests of shareholders and
managers, thus reducing the agency costs that would otherwise
attend the formation of a public corporation.10 9 Yet, any such
inconsistency is only apparent. Market mechanisms and the legal
rules that support them need not arise exogenously, independent of
the needs of market actors. Instead, the various mechanisms that
align the interests of shareholders and managers, all of which
appear dependent on the shareholder primacy norm, may be
entirely endogenous, having arisen in response to the threat of
opportunism that shareholders would otherwise face.110 Take, as an
example, the market for corporate control, often viewed as an
important mechanism for deterring management opportunism
towards shareholders.11' This mechanism depends upon a
combination of markets (stock exchanges) and public law-the
(default) rule that common shares, and only common shares, come
with one vote each in elections of the Board of Directors."2 Stock
exchanges, of course, do not exist in a vacuum; they arise to
109. See infra notes 180-87 and accompanying text. Indeed, one author has defended the
shareholder primacy norm based in part on an assertion that such mechanisms do a poor job
aligning the interest of shareholders and managers. See Van Der Weide, supra note 89, at
69-72. As shown in the text, however, one need not believe that market mechanisms are
relatively ineffective to embrace the shareholder primacy norm.
110. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 306 (arguing that the
institution of "the board of directors ... arises endogenously, as a means by which to
safeguard the investments of those [shareholders] who face a diffuse but significant risk of
expropriation").
111. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK&FISCHEL,supra note 4, at 171-74; Butler, supra note 26, at
111-13.
112. The "one share, one vote" rule is not immutable, but instead a product of legislative
or firm choice. German corporations, for instance, generally prohibit any shareholder from
voting more than five percent of a firm's shares. See Jayne Barnard, Institutional Investors
and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1135,1138 n.14 (1991) (noting existence
of German "rules prohibiting shareholders with more than five or ten percent of a company's
equity from voting the excess over that percentage"); William W. Bratton & Joseph A.
McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The CaseAgainst
Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213, 237 n.71 (1999) (discussing recent
German reforms making it more difficult for institutions to vote large blocks of common
shares); Merritt B. Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in
a Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 MICH. L. REv. 696, 759 n.135 (1999) (reporting
Germanjudicial nullification of shareholder vote to repeal bylaw placing five percent cap on
shareholder voting),
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facilitate the issuance and trading of securities and adopt rules
designed to enhance investor demand for the shares traded."'
Although a "legal" mechanism, shareholder voting is also
endogenous. 114 Taken together, these two mechanisms, along with
society's toleration for large disparities in wealth, empower a raider
to aggregate a majority interest and thus remove the Board of
Directors, an institution that some have also characterized as
endogenous." 5 Far from rebutting claims that shareholders are
vulnerable to exploitation, the evolution and survival of these
various mechanisms and supporting institutions that attenuate
opportunism, all supported by the shareholder primacy norm,
reinforce the claim that shareholders are otherwise specially
vulnerable to opportunism." 6
The surmise that nonshareholder participants in private firms
face a greater risk of opportunism on balance than do similar
participants in publicly held firms may, at first glance, seem to
bolster Blair and Stout's assertion that the distinctive features of
the public corporation are designed to thwart intra-team
opportunism via creation of a mediating hierarch. Perhaps the
prescription they have identified is working! Not so fast. The
113. See HANSMANN, supra note 4, at 60 (disclosure rules and rigorous accounting
standards can reduce agency costs); WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at
306 (same). See generally Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453
(1997).
114. See HANSMANN, supra note 4, at 63 (placing voting control in hands of common
shareholders is "neither a necessity nor an accident, but instead the product of design");
Henry Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1430-31
(1964).
115. See DEMSETZ, supra note 41, at 231-34 (social tolerance of large wealth disparities
allows individuals to amass large blocks of shares and thus to engage in effective
monitoring); WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 306 (arguing that the
Board of Directors arises endogenously, to oversee management on behalf of shareholders);
Coase, supra note 86, at 716-18 (changes in institutional arrangements can affect transaction
costs and thus alter content of resulting economic activity); Manne, supra note 114, at 1430-
31; see also Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 3, at 788 (noting that residual claimants' ability
to aggregate sufficient shares to oust management can reduce the agency costs produced by
the separation of ownership from control that characterizes the public corporation).
116. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITIONS, supra note 3, at 323-34 (arguing that the
assignment of single ownership to shareholders arises "not by history but by logic"); see also
infra notes 119-27 and accompanying text (noting that existence of mechanisms that align
the interests of shareholders and directors appears inconsistent with a "mediating hierarch"
model of firm governance).
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prescription Blair and Stout have identified is not the formation of
a public corporation as such, but instead the formation of a public
corporation governed by mediating hierarchs. Yet, the opportunism-
reducing features described above inure to employees and creditors
of public corporations regardless of whether a firm has adopted a
mediating hierarch model of internal governance. That is, for
reasons entirely exogenous to governance structure, creditors and
employees in private firms face the same or greater risk of
opportunism than do similarly situated individuals in publicly held
firms.
Thus, creditors and employees who make team-specific invest-
ments in enterprises organized as public corporations may face a
reduced risk of opportunism compared to those who deal with
partnerships and closely held corporations, for instance. Moreover,
shareholders of publicly-held firms seem to face a greater risk of
opportunism than owners of private firms. This realization raises
a crucial question for Blair and Stout. If departure from a single-
owner standard and delegation of authority to mediating hierarchs
"works" for public corporations, such a model of firm governance
would seem to produce the same or even greater benefits for other
firms, Where employees and creditors are arguablymore vulnerable
to opportunism by residual claimants, and residual claimants are
less vulnerable, and thus less in need of the protection accorded by
a single-owner model. Yet, as Blair and Stout concede, the laws of
partnerships, sole proprietorships, and closely held corporations
organize team production along a single-owner model, under which
the firm is run to maximize the profits of a single individual or class
of residual claimants. Moreover, Blair and Stout do not assert that
these private firms create unaccountable mediating hierarchs by
contract, even when such firms involve specific investments and a
high risk of opportunism.
If, as Blair and Stout assume, states generate the rules governing
various forms of business organization with a view toward
maximizing social wealth, the absence of mediating hierarchs in
private firms would seem to rebut their assertion that creation of
mediating hierarchs minimizes the transaction costs produced by
the spectre of opportunism inherent in the sort of large-scale team
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production that characterizes the publicly held corporation.11
Adoption of a single-owner standard minimizes shareholder
vulnerability to opportunism by other constituencies, thus reducing
the transaction costs of obtaining equity investment. At the same
time, these other constituencies can protect themselves from
shareholder opportunism via contract or other devices, and the
institutional framework has evolved to facilitate reliance on these
mechanisms, obviating the need to adjust corporate law to
implement a mediating hierarch model of governance. 1 8 While not
a perfect solution to the risks of opportunism that accompany team-
specific investments, the shareholder primacy norm would seem to
be the least imperfect.
B. Ownership Costs
To this point we have assumed that nonowner constituents of
privately held firms are just as likely to make team-specific
investments as their counterparts in larger, publicly held firms.
Moreover, we have argued that various attributes of publicly held
firms render nonowner constituents of such entities less susceptible
117. Perhaps anticipating such an argument, Blair and Stout assert in a footnote that it
would be impractical for directors of closely held corporations to operate as mediating
hierarchs because they are directly accountable to the majority shareholder. Blair & Stout,
supra note 9, at 302 n.136. This argument assumes that various market mechanisms do not
render directors accountable to shareholders in public corporations as well. See infra notes
180-81 and accompanying text (summarizing arguments by principal-agent theorists that
market forces align the interests of shareholders and directors). Moreover, the argument
simply begs the question of why states allow majority shareholders to dictate the selection
of directors in closely held firms. Ifa mediating hierarch approach were efficient, states could
depart from the rule of one share, one vote, or simply allow directors to appoint their
successors. Indeed, Blair and Stout assert that the right of shareholders to elect directors in
public corporations is illusory; directors, they say, in fact control the election process. Blair
& Stout, supra note 9, at 310-11. Thus, states could implement a mediating hierarch model
for closely held firms by providing that the founding shareholders would choose directors by
unanimous consent, and that directors would subsequently appoint their successors. Cf.
Mitchell, supra note 19, at 1302-03 (arguing that states should constitute directors as
mediators by abolishing shareholder voting for directors and empowering directors to appoint
their successors). In the alternative, states could limit the number ofvotes that shareholders
could cast. See supra note 112 (discussing such limitations in German corporations). The
failure of states to adopt such rules governing the selection of directors suggests that a
mediating hierarch approach to governing closely held corporations is less efficient than a
single-owner model.
118. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 302-11.
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to opportunism in the first instance and better able to protect
themselves from such conduct via market contracting. Like Blair
and Stout, however, we have offered no concrete empirical evidence
to support these assertions. Thus, the argument here that a public
corporation organized along a single-owner model involves lower
transaction costs than private firms may not convince scholars
otherwise inclined to embrace the Blair and Stout thesis.
At any rate, proof that public corporations involve lower
transaction costs than their private counterparts does not by itself
establish the superiority of single-owner firms in either context.
While Blair and Stout have conceded that a single-owner model is
the most efficient approach for private firms, this concession may
be unwarranted. After all, Blair and Stout have not considered the
possibility that such firms themselves often involve team-specific
investment by various constituencies. Moreover, Blair and Stout
have suggested that adoption of a mediating hierarch approach to
governance would be unworkable for single-owner firms such as
closely held corporations.'19
Put another way, the analysis offered thus far may simply call
attention to the fact that the threat of opportunism abounds in all
sorts of firms, public or private. Perhaps a mediating hierarch
approach to firm governance is theoretically superior for both public
and private firms, only workable for the former. Indeed, it seems
hard to dispute the assertion that a director who sets out to
maximize the joint welfare of the team will, in theory at least, take
steps that minimize the cost of transacting. Thus, proof that
119. See Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 303 n.136 (arguing that directors of closely held
corporations cannot act as mediating hierarchs because they are beholden to majority-
shareholders); see also supra note 117 (arguing that states could provide for mediating
hierarch approach in closely held finms by allowing founding shareholders to appoint
directors and empowering directors to appoint their successors). One may add an additional
argument supporting Blair and Stout's assertion that a mediating hierarch approach is
unworkable for private firms. To the extent that 1) private firms are relatively small, and 2)
the cost of a mediating hierarch model of governance is in part fixed, such a system will
entail a higher cost per unit of output where private firms are concerned. This argument
provides only partial support for Blair and Stout's thesis, however. Many closely held
corporations, for example, operate at the same or greater scale as some publicly held
corporations. See supra note 80 (listingvarious large closelyheld corporations). The absence
of a mediating hierarch system in these firms cannot be explained by the cost of such
arrangements.
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publicly held firms involve lower transaction costs than private
firms could be entirely consistent with Blair and Stout's conclusion
that a mediating hierarch approach can minimize these costs in
both sorts of firm. Ultimately, however, the case against the
mediating hierarch model of corporate governance does not
necessarily depend upon proof that a single-owner approach can
produce lower transaction costs than a mediating hierarch model.
Instead, there would appear to be an independent theoretical
objection to the adoption of a mediating hierarch form of govern-
ance.
According to Blair and Stout, a mediating hierarch approach to
corporate governance will minimize the transaction costs of
inducing team-specific investment and thus maximize social
welfare. Yet, even if one accepts the numerous assumptions on
which this assertion is based, the statement is nevertheless a
nonsequitur. The mere fact that a governance structure minimizes
the cost of transacting in this sense does not establish that it is
preferable to other structures. Instead, as some scholars have
argued, there is a second cost to consider, namely, the so-called cost
of ownership. 120 More precisely, any particular assignment of
control rights and entitlement to a firm's residual product entails
unique costs over and above the transaction costs that attend
coordination of the firm's various inputs.12' Assigning ownership
and control rights to dispersed shareholders, for instance, will
engender various monitoring costs. 122 An efficient governance
structure will do more than minimize the costs of transacting; it
will instead minimize the sum of transaction and ownership
costs.
1 2 3
Blair and Stout's analysis focuses exclusively on the transaction
cost implications of alternative institutional arrangements; they do
not consider the relative costs of ownership produced by single-
owner and mediating hierarch approaches, respectively. As shown
120. See HANSMANN, supra note 4, at 35-49; Van Der Weide, supra note 89, at 34-35, 36-
39.
121. HANSMANN, supra note 4, at 19-20 (distinguishing between "ownership costs" and
transaction costs).
122. Id. at 57-62.
123. Id. at 21-22.
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below, a mediating hierarch model of corporate governance would
entail substantial ownership costs over and above those associated
with a single-owner approach that assigns common shareholders an
exclusive property right in the firm's residual product.
As an initial matter, adoption of a mediating hierarch model
would cause firms to forgo one of the principal benefits of the
corporate form-agent expertise. Almost by definition, directors
who are neutral mediating hierarchs will lack the specialized
knowledge and experience possessed by the corporation's officers
and managers, some of whom currently serve as directors in
publicly held firms. 24 Blair and Stout admit as much, even arguing
at one point that the very incompetence of mediating hierarchs will
encourage various constituencies to "get along," lest these directors
actually assert control over a firm's affairs." Thus, even if vesting
control over a firm in mediating hierarchs could reduce somewhat
the possibility of opportunism and thus lower transaction costs, any
such improvement would come at the expense of the gains that
would otherwise be realized by vesting de facto control of the firm
in full-time, specialist managers.'26
There is, however, a more fundamental problem with the
mediating hierarch model. Although Blair and Stout have told a
coherent story about how such a model can encourage firm-specific
investment and thus enhance the firm's total product, they have
failed to describe any plausible mechanism that will encourage
124. See infranotes 285-90 and accompanyingtext (summarizingevidence suggestingthat
inside directors usually exercise de facto control over publicly held corporations).
125. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 282 ("T]he existence of a mediating hierarchy may
heighten incentives for team members to work out conflicts among themselves because the
alternative is kicking the problem upstairs to a disinterested-but potentially erratic or ill-
informed-hierarch.").
126. Cf EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 11; see also infra notes 285-90 and
accompanying text (showing that most publicly held corporations are under de facto control
of inside directors). To be sure, Blair and Stout make it clear that the mediating hierarchs
they envision will not be involved in day-to-day management of the firm's affairs. Blair &
Stout, supra note 9, at 282 ("[Bly suggesting that directors serve at the top of the pyramid
of authority that comprises the public corporation, the mediating hierarchy model does not
imply that directors actually manage the corporation on a day-to-day basis."). Nevertheless,
they do contemplate that the directors they envision will choose and supervise managers
with sufficient care and attention to deter opportunism that might be directed at any
constituency of the firm that has made team-specific investments. Hierarchs with this much
latitude over a firm's affairs will have numerous opportunities to make poor decisions.
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directors who act as mediating hierarchs to pursue their duties in
a conscientious manner. Such hierarchs would not hold residual
claims; nor would they be legally accountable to anyone who does.12
Moreover, Blair and Stout have not identified any legal or market
mechanisms that cause mediating hierarchs to maximize the
welfare of the team. Indeed, as Blair and Stout see things, the
greatest virtue possessed by such hierarchs is their independence
from any such influence.
Blair and Stout do claim that directors will have an interest in
cultivating a reputation for being "good" directors: such a
reputation, it is said, will help directors retain their current
positions and obtain others.' This assertion, however, simply begs
the key question: what (if anything) encourages those who nominate
and hire directors-other directors-to define as "good" a director
who maximizes the product of the team, instead of the product
available to shareholders, or, for that matter the product available
to directors?u 9 Absent some independent mechanism that induces
directors to internalize the residual product of the team they
supervise, this argument seems entirely circular. 3 '
Blair and Stout also assert that "corporate cultural norms of
fairness and trust .. may work to encourage directors to serve
their firms."13 Blair and Stout do not explain how such norms
actually arise; nor do they offer any evidence that they are
sufficiently pervasive to induce directors to pursue with diligence
the welfare of the teams they supervise, instead of the welfare of
shareholders as such. Moreover, they do not explain how such
norms can overcome the market mechanisms that concededly cause
management to pursue the interests of shareholders. 32
,127. Such hierarchs would of course be subject to derivative suits by shareholders.
However, as Blair and Stout themselves argue, the threat of such suits has little impact on
directors' conduct.
128. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 315.
129. See id. at 310-11 (contending that directors exercise de facto control over process of
nomination and selection of their successors).
130. Blair and Stout also suggest that corporate law "encourages directors to serve their
firms' interests by severely limiting their abilities to serve their own." Id. at 315. Preventing
directors from pursuing their own interest, however, does not encourage them to pursue the
interests of the team.
131. Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
132. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text (describing various market
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To be sure, a regime that divided the right to a firm's residual
among numerous constituencies and allowed directors to distribute
the residual as they saw fit would provide various constituencies
with the incentives to monitor directors to ensure that these
hierarchs are acting in their particular interest. More precisely,
each constituency would presumably pressure hierarchs to
maximize the amount of residual distributed to it. However,
because no constituency would be entitled to any particular share
of the residual, none would have the incentive or the ability to
monitor directors' actions as they relate to the joint product of the
entire team. Because the fruits of this monitoring would become
common property, no constituency could capture more than a
fraction of the benefits of such monitoring, and efforts to produce
such monitoring would be beset by free riding. 3 ' What course
unaccountable directors actuallywould take in these circumstances
is anybody's guess.
Various constituencies could also share information and bargain
among themselves, agreeing to urge on directors the actions they
believed to be in their collective interests. In the absence of
bargaining and information costs, such continual negotiation would
maximize the production of the team.'3 ' By its nature, however, a
mediating hierarch model of governance ensures that the costs of
such bargaining would be exceedingly high.' Each constituency
would have to gather information about the effect of various
corporate actions on its members, and constituencies would have to
mechanisms that induce directors to act in the interest of shareholders); see also Blair &
Stout, supra note 9, at 327-28 & n.207 (expressing concern about purportedly recent
developments that have caused managers to pursue shareholder value exclusively).
133. Demsetz, supra note 68, at 356 ("Under the communal property system the
maximization of the value of communal property rights will take place without regard to
many costs, because the owner of a communal right cannot exclude others from enjoying the
fruit of his efforts.").
134. Cf Coase, supra note 42, passim.
135. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. ECON.
HIST. 16, 22 (1973) ("If the cost of transactions is not negligible, then an alteration in the
identity of right owners can have allocative effects because negotiations toward a unique
utilization of resources may be inhibited by positive transaction costs. The most important
effect of alterations in institutional arrangements may well be the impact of such
reorganizations on the cost of transacting."); see also id. at 27-28 (stating that cost of
transacting is a function of background legal rules and the assignment of rights); Coase,
supra note 86, at 717-18 (same).
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come to agreement about the collective effect of various possible
courses of action. Moreover, "collective" recommendations would
require unanimous consent, thus raising the possibility that
individual constituencies could "hold out," seeking to appropriate a
greater share of the team's joint product for themselves.'36
Thus, even if adoption of a mediating hierarch model of
governance could theoretically reduce the transaction costs
associated with team-specific investment, any such benefit would
come at a high cost: control of the firm by disinterested individuals
with no apparent incentive to maximize the welfare of the team.
Such hierarchs would find it very difficult in practice to convince
constituents that they planned to maximize the welfare of the team.
Therefore, such hierarchs could not make credible commitments to
protect various constituencies from opportunism.3 7 Without such
credibility, a mediating hierarch model of corporate governance
could not reduce the transaction costs of inducing firm-specific
investment. If anything, this state of affairs would increase such
costs, as each constituency would now have to fear opportunism
from all constituencies, and not just from shareholders. The
shareholder primacy norm, of course, avoids these costs, by
assigning a property right in the firm's residual to a single
constituency, and allowing expert agents of that constituency to
negotiate individually with other constituencies in a setting of
relatively low bargaining costs. In such a setting, these agents will
have the incentive to craft a nexus of agreements that induce team-
specific investment and maximize the team's joint welfare.1 8
It should be noted that the costs of ownership produced by
departure from the shareholder primacy norm would afflict all
corporate activities, not just those that relate to possible
136. Cf. Epstein, supra note 42, at 559-61 (rules requiring consent of all parties affected
by a decision raise the prospect of holdouts and result in high bargaining costs and possible
deadlock).
137. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text (describing Blair and Stout's assertion
that the mediating hierarch model empowers firms to make credible commitments to refrain
from opportunism).
138. Cf. Epstein, supra note 42, at 556-57; Alan J. Meese,Antitrust Balancing InA (Near)
Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 111, 132-35 (1996)
(where bargaining costs are low, a single owner of franchise trademark will draft franchise
contract that includes provisions minimizing the costs of opportunism).
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opportunism. The mediating hierarchs that Blair and Stout
envision will have ultimate authority over the entire range of
corporate decisions, most of which involve constituencies that have
not made team-specific investments or do not involve any conflict
among those constituencies that have. Indeed, as Blair and Stout
themselves concede, the interests of shareholders are usually
aligned with the interests of other constituencies, thus suggesting
that, in most cases, decisions that maximize share value will also
maximize the welfare of the team.'39 Thus, whatever isolated
benefits that adoption of a mediating hierarch model of governance
might produce will be outweighed by the generalized efficiency
losses generated by such a regime.
Indeed, Blair and Stout's proposal to replace the shareholder
primacy norm with a mediating hierarch approach violates a
central tenet of the team production theory of the firm on which
they base their proposal. The team production theory, after all,
rests on a realization that someone must monitor the team to
maximize its output. Once such a monitor exists, a natural question
arises: "Who will monitor the monitor?" 4' Alchian and Demsetz
posed this very question, and the solution they proposed is
straightforward: there is no need to monitor the monitor if he or she
possesses a property right to the team's residual product and can
sell that right and associated control if necessary to someone who
is able to do a better job. In these circumstances, it might be said,
the monitor will take care of itself. In fact, Alchian and Demsetz
expressly noted that, by uniting residual claims with votes,
corporate law provides shareholders with the incentive and ability
to monitor and replace managers who do not maximize the team's
net product. 4 2 In contrast, Blair and Stout deprive shareholders of
139. See Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 313-14; see also EASTER3ROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 4, at 38 ("[Mlaximizing profits for equity investors assists the other 'constituencies'
automatically. The participants in the venture play complementary rather than antagonistic
roles.").
140. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 3, at 782.
141. See i& at 782-83; id. at 794 (concluding that "the essence of a classical business firm"
includes a single owner who "holds the residual claim" and "has the right to sell his central
contractual status").
142. Id. at 788; see also DEMSETZ, supra note 41, at 231-33 (arguing that ability of
shareholders to amass a large block of shares can facilitate shareholder monitoring of
management).
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any meaningful property right in the firm's residual, thus leaving
their monitor, the mediating hierarch, free from effective oversight.
They thus leave unanswered the central question: Who will monitor
the monitor?
Adoption of the shareholder primacy norm does not require
directors to "ruthlessly pursue shareholders' interests at the
expense of employees, creditors, or other team members."143 To the
contrary, directors may serve shareholder interests best by
refraining from opportunistic conduct or providing credible
guarantees that such behavior will not occur in the future.144
Managers bargaining on behalf of a single owner-shareholders-
will act as if they internalize the entire residual to which
shareholders are entitled. Thus, these managers will internalize the
benefits of inducing team-specific investment. They will also
internalize the costs-in the form of higher wages, unfavorable
credit terms, and the like-that flow from a failure to provide
credible commitments that the firm will not exploit such
investments.'45 Because the cost of bargaining in such a setting is
relatively low, managers that hope to maximize shareholder
returns by inducing various constituencies to make firm-specific
investments will have no choice but to offer assurances that
the firm will refrain from opportunistic exploitation of these
investments. 46 Such assurances can take the form of explicit
contracts, such as collective bargaining agreements or bond
covenants. 47 They may also consist of less formal mechanisms, such
143. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 280.
144. Cf. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985)
(management may consider interests of nonshareholder constituencies when necessary to
advance the long-term interests of shareholders).
145. See generally WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 32-35 (buyer
that fails to provide seller adequate assurance against opportunism will pay higher price for
inputs); Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45
UCLA L. REV. 143, 187 (1997) (manufacturer will charge lower price to dealer that provides
credible assurances against opportunism).
146. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 303 (firms can pay lower
wages if they provide workers with assurances against opportunism); Van Der Weide, supra
note 89, at 85 ("Directors and officers should consider the interests of all stakeholders as they
maximize share value. Maintaining good relations with creditors, suppliers, customers, and
workers are all important parts of maximizing firm profitability.").
147. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173; WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at
307, 313.
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as the creation of hostages that ensure that the firm suffers a de
facto penalty if management refuses to honor a constituency's
expectations. 4 ' A large manufacturing concern, for instance, may
make investments that are only useful in a particular location as a
means of protecting workers or the local community against the
possibility that the firm will unexpectedly move its operations
overseas. 9 By vesting shareholders with an exclusive right to a
corporation's residual, then, the principal-agent model facilitates
adoption of the sort of mechanisms that can reduce the risk of
opportunism and thus minimize the transaction costs associated
with inducing team-specific investment.
Ultimately, Blair and Stout's project would appear to be a
quintessential application of what some principal-agent theorists
have called the Nirvana Fallacy. 5 ' Emphasizing the imperfections
of a principal-agent model, Blair and Stout have offered an
alternative that, in theory, could obviate the model's perceived
shortcomings. Yet, the question is not whether a theoretical model
bests a real-world alternative. The question is instead how the two
models compare in the real world.'5 ' In the real world, it seems, the
principal-agent model is economically superior to a mediating
hierarch approach.
DELAWARE'S EMBRACE OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
It would appear that the principal-agent conception of the public
corporation is a superior economic arrangement to the mediating
148. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to
Support Exchange, 73 A. ECON. REV. 519 (1983).
149. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 310 (suggesting that
communities can protect themselves against opportunism by insisting that firms "make
specialized investments").
150. DanielR. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND.L.REV. 1259,1272
(1982); see also Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 1 (1969) ("In practice, those who adopt the nirvana viewpoint seek to discover
discrepancies between the ideal and the real and if discrepancies are found, they deduce that
the real is inefficient.").
151. Fischel, supra note 150, at 1272 ("Those who purport to discover discrepancies
between an ideal norm and existing imperfect institutional arrangements and then conclude
that existing arrangements should be displaced, commit the nirvana fallacy well known in
economic literature.").
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hierarch approach that Blair and Stout support. Theoretical
arguments to one side, however, one could argue that the "proof is
in the pudding," i.e., in what type of regimes states have actually
adopted. If one posits that states generally adopt efficient bodies of
corporate law, and if states have, in fact, adopted corporate law that
reflects a mediating hierarch approach to firm governance, then it
would be difficult to dispute Blair and Stout's thesis.
Not surprisingly, then, Blair and Stout claim that the mediating
hierarch theory of the public corporation is consistent with the
content of corporate law, in particular, the various doctrines gov-
erning the authority of directors and their duties to shareholders
and other constituents of the firm. 152 They sensibly focus on the law
of Delaware, a state with powerful incentives to promulgate wealth-
maximizing corporate law. 5 ' At the same time, Blair and Stout
argue that the law of Delaware is inconsistent with the principal-
agent view of the director-shareholder relationship and thus the
shareholder primacy norm.'54 In so doing, Blair and Stout reject the
contrary assertion by numerous scholars, some of whom share their
view that directors should act as mediators between different
constituencies.'55
152. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 287-319.
153. ROBERTAROMANO, THE GENIus OFAmERIcAN CoRPORATE LAW 37-44 (1993). It should
be noted that some scholars believe that Delaware does not possess sufficient incentives to
promulgate efficient corporate law. E.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward
an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 498-509 (1987)
(arguing that Delaware corporate law is driven in part by pressure from interest groups,
including the corporate bar). Blair and Stout assume otherwise, however, and this Essay
embraces their position on this point, at least for the sake of argument.
154. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 290-92.
155. E.g., David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate
Law, 50 WASH. &LEEL. REv. 1373, 1374 (1993) (noting thatshareholder primacy has served
as corporate law's governing norm for much of this century."); Mitchell, supra note 19, at
1284 ("At this point in our legal history, there is no serious dispute over the proposition that
corporate managers' duties are owed to the stockholders .... Thus it seems clear that any
suggestions that the law, as currently formulated and applied, permits consideration of non-
stockholder interests in any meaningful way can be put to rest."); see also DOOLEY, supra
note 28, at 97 ("[Ilt is generally agreed that managements principal fiduciary duty is to
maximize the return to the common shareholders,"); Smith, supra note 7, at 283 (concluding
that "[miodern corporate law scholarship" has reached a consensus that corporate law
implements a shareholder primacy norm). But see Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary
and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEx. L. REv. 865, 908-33 (1990)
(arguing that, at least in the takeover context, the notion of shareholder primacy has been
renounced by state legislatures and "meets stern resistance in Delaware's judge-made
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As explained below, Blair and Stout's exegesis is unconvincingfor
several interrelated reasons. First, the doctrines that Blair and
Stout describe accurately are at least equally consistent with the
principal-agent conception of the public corporation, particularly
when one accounts for the fact that various market mechanisms can
align the interests of shareholders and directors. Second, some
doctrines that Blair and Stout invoke are, on closer inspection, more
consistent with the shareholder primacy norm than with a
mediating hierarch approach. Third, Blair and Stout ignore certain
decisions, most notably, Smith v. Van Gorkom,56 that are flatly
inconsistent with their mediating hierarch approach to governance,
and are instead consistent with a principal-agent approach. Finally,
Blair and Stout offer no explanation for the states' collective refusal
to impose a mediating hierarch model of corporate governance in
their corporate codes. While such statutes allow corporations to
empower directors to function as mediating hierarchs, few firms
actually do so, choosing instead to repose de facto control over the
firm's affairs in inside directors who themselves have made
significant specific investments in the enterprise. Delaware
corporate law is entirely consistent with a principal-agent model of
governance, and adoption of a mediating hierarch model would
require Delaware to alter its corporate law in a variety of ways.
A. Lack of Director Accountability
Blair and Stout invoke a variety of doctrines and decisional law
regarding the relationship between shareholders and directors in
support of their claim that corporate law regards directors of public
corporations as mediatinghierarchs. For instance, the authors note
that corporate law does not, in fact, treat directors as shareholder
agents, but instead regards directors as akin to trustees. 157
Moreover, while shareholders nominally elect directors, Blair and
Stout contend that, in practice, directors control the proxy
machinery and thus the election process. 158 To be sure, corporate
doctrine").
156. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
157. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 290-92.
158. Id. at 310-11.
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law uniformly imposes upon directors a duty of care.'59 As Blair and
Stout see things, however, this duty is more illusory than real,
given the protection accorded director decisions by the business
judgment rule. 60 According to Blair and Stout, this device-which
immunizes any rational, good-faith decision made with sufficient
process--"seriously undermines directors' accountability to
shareholders by virtually insulating directors from claims of lack of
care, [and thus] it seems inconsistent with the view that directors
are shareholders' agents."'6 ' Finally, Blair and Stout assert that
decisional law regarding the content of fiduciary duties empowers
directors expressly to pursue the interests of other constituencies,
even at the expense of shareholders. 62
Blair and Stout also emphasize important procedural obstacles
that hinder shareholder enforcement of whatever fiduciary duties
directors might possess.' For instance, before bringing a derivative
action, a shareholder must first demand that directors take some
action to remedy the purported wrong.'64 Further, even in those
cases where demand is initially excused, the board may take control
of the litigation by appointing a committee of independent directors,
who may decide to terminate the litigation.6 ' Finally, even if a
shareholder should negotiate these obstacles and recover a
judgment against the directors, Blair and Stout point out that any
such judgment is paid into the corporate treasury, and not to the
shareholders directly.6 '
Taken together, these various features of corporate law would
seem to place directors beyond the control of shareholders, thus
empowering them to act as mediating hierarchs. Indeed, Blair and
Stout claim that proponents of the principal-agent conception of the
public corporation and shareholder primacy norm are "puzzled" by
these various aspects of corporate law, precisely because they confer
159. See generally CLARK, supra note 27, § 3.4.
160. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 299-301.
161. Id. at 300.
162. Id. at 301-03.
163. Id. at 292-97.
164. Id. at 294; see also, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 809 (Del. 1984).
165. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 294; see also, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A-2d 779, 781 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996 (N.Y. 1979).
166. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 294-95.
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so much discretion on directors. 67 Blair and Stout even go so far as
to assert that the very existence of the board of directors is itself
"puzzling," and only explicable under a mediating hierarch model. 68
However, as shown below, the various doctrines of Delaware law
that accord directors significant discretion are in fact quite
consistent with the principal-agent conception of the public
corporation.
Far from being "puzzled," principal-agent theorists recognize and
even applaud many of the very same doctrines that Blair and Stout
invoke. Take the existence of the board of directors. As noted
earlier, principal-agent theorists contend that shareholders are
particularly vulnerable to opportunism at the hands of managers.'69
According to these theorists, the board of directors arises
endogenously, as a mechanism to supervise managers on behalf of
shareholders, and shareholders alone. 70 The existence of the board
of directors, then, is entirely consistent with the principal-agent
model.
Principal-agent theorists also praise the business judgment
rule.'7 ' Certainly this rule insulates directors from much judicial
oversight that could, conceivably, encourage directors to act in
shareholder interests. However, in seizing upon this and other
aspects of corporate law that appear to empower directors, Blair
167. Id. at 319; see also id. at 254-55 (suggesting that "several key legal doctrines
distinguishing public corporations from other business forms... are difficult to reconcile with
the principal-agent approach" and that "[these fundamental and otherwise puzzling
characteristics of public corporation law can be explained as a response to the team
production problem").
168. Id. at 251 (describing the board of directors as "that otherwise puzzling institution").
169. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
170. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 306 (arguing that the
institution of "[tihe board of directors ... arises endogenously, as a means by which to
safeguard the investments of those [shareholders] who face a diffuse but significant risk of
expropriation").
171. Indeed, Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel introduce their pathbreaking book
with a promise to explain the vast discretion that corporate law confers on directors:
Why does corporate law allow managers to set the terms under which they will
administer corporate assets? Why do courts grant more discretion to self-
interested managers than to disinterested regulators? Why do investors entrust
such stupendous sums to managers whose acts are essentially unconstrained
by legal rules? We offer answers to these questions, explanations of the economic
structure of corporate law.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 3-4 (emphasis added).
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and Stout have committed a methodological error quite common
among corporate law scholars: they have assumed that formal legal
constraints are the only mechanism for aligning the interests of
shareholders and directors. 172 As principal-agent theorists have long
pointed out, however, numerous market mechanisms exist that help
align the interests of shareholders and those who run public
corporations, mechanisms that help explain the vast discretion
corporate law confers on directors. 73 For instance, directors and
managers who fail to maximize profits will suffer in the labor
market, as they find it difficult to obtain remunerative employment
at other firms. 174 Further, corporations that produce high-priced or
poor-quality output will be punished in the product market, as
consumers turn to other firms, thus lowering corporate earnings. 171
If carried to an extreme, such incompetence may spell the death of
the firm and, of course, cost managers and directors their jobs. 76
Even if firms stay in business, however, lower corporate earnings
172. Some scholars have traced the origins of this methodological error to Berle and
Means. See generally ADOLFA. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). According to Professor Butler, for instance:
The Berle and Means perspective on the corporation has fostered the view
among some legal commentators that corporation law is the only meaningful
constraint on managerial behavior. This has ledto public policy arguments that
place great emphasis on the role of laws in governing the relationship between
shareholders andmanagers. Inessence, some commentators have assumedthat
managers, freed from legal constraints, can abuse shareholders' interests
without cost. Corporation law, according to this view, plays a pre-eminent role
in maintaining balance in the large corporation characterized by a separation
of ownership and control.
Butler, supra note 26, at 102; see also Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of the Nature of
the Firm on the Theory of Corporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213, 219-29 (1993) (showing that
Berle and Means and other realist scholars assumed without proof that corporation law is
the only vehicle for reducing agency costs); id. at 221 (concluding that this Berle and Means
approach "mirrored perfectly the dominant scholarly method adopted by law professors of
their own generation and generations to come").
173. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories
and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
4, at 91-97; ROMANO, supra note 153, 14-15; RALPH K WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE
CORPORATION, 7-28 (1978); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary
Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REv. 1, 18-44 (1990).
174. E.g., EASTERBROOK&FISCHEL,supra note 4, at 91; Butler & Ribstein, supra note 173,
at 25-27; see also Fama, supra note 99, passim.
175. EASTERBROK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 91; WINTER, supra note 173, at 17-18;
Butler, supra note 26, at 114.
176. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 91.
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will likely translate into reduced incomes for managers, who
often own significant blocks of the firm's stock or work pursuant
to contracts that tie pay to performance via stock options and
the like.177 Finally, firms that underperform will suffer in the
capital market, as creditors demand higher rates of interest and
stockholders see share prices fUllM 8  Falling share prices, of
course, will evoke the market for corporate control, as bidders
amass a majority of a firm's common shares and oust incumbent
managers.1 7 9
According to principal-agent theorists, these various market
mechanisms have evolved to fortify the shareholder primacy norm,
protecting shareholders from the sort of manager opportunism that
might otherwise flow from the separation of ownership from
control. 80 The presence of these mechanisms, it is said, obviates the
177. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 173, at 26-27; Harold Demsetz, The Structure of
Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375, 387-90 (1983) (finding that
directors and officers often hold significant blocks of a firm's shares).
178. EAsTERBROOK&FISCHEL,supra note 4, at 4-7; J.A.C. Hetherington, When the Sleeper
Wakes:Reflections on Corporate Governance and ShareholderRights, 8 HOFSTRAL.REV. 183,
186-87 (1979).
179. EASTERBROOK&FISCHELsupra note 4, at 171-72; WINTER,supra note 173, at 18-20;
Butler & Ribstein, supra note 173, at 23-25; Hetherington, supra note 178, at 186-87; Henry
G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 110-20
(1965); see also Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 3, at 788 (contending that the market for
corporate control can discipline directors and managers who fail to oversee the team
efficiently).
180. Easterbrook, supra note 173; at 543-70 (collecting and summarizing evidence that
various market mechanisms align the interests of shareholders and managers). In their
conclusion, Blair and Stout note that market forces can cause directors to act in the interests
of shareholders and that "recent[ly]" directors have begun pursuing shareholder interests
exclusively. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 326-27 & n.207. Other scholars disagree with
Blair and Stout's assertion that market-induced attention to shareholder interests is a
"recent" phenomenon. As one noted economist put it over three decades ago:
Reports of the deliberations of the top levels of management in major American
corporations seem to indicate a widespread concern with the performance ofthe
companies' securities. Even in companies which have long refrained from the
issue of new stocks and which apparently have no plans for such an issue in the
foreseeable future there seems to be a heavy preoccupation with the market's
evaluation of the corporation's shares. Whatever the reasons ... this concern is
by itself sufficient to empower the market to oversee the behavior of
management. If the businessman is motivated to avoid reductions in the price
of his firm's securities and if, in fact, he hopes that those prices will rise rather
steadily and dependably with the passage of time, he will be driven to adapt his
decisions to this purpose. Behavior which depresses security prices will then
conflict with company objectives.
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necessity of intrusive judicial review of director (or manager) action;
why should courts intrude when markets can do a better job?18 The
existence of these mechanisms and the associated shareholder
primacy norm also explain why the business judgment rule applies
to decisions by nondirector officers, who are members of the team
and emphatically not mediating hierarchs.'82 A mediating hierarch
model of firm governance, on the other hand, simply cannot explain
or account for such deference to decisions by particular members of
the team.
Importantly, principal-agent theorists have argued that the
structure of fiduciary duties reflects the relative potency of market
mechanisms in various contexts. Where, for instance, market
mechanisms work well, courts will and should stay their hand.18
Where, on the other hand, such mechanisms will likely be
ineffective, as when, for instance, directors are in the final period,
judicial review should be more intrusive.'84 Corporate law, of
course, tracks these insights.'85
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKE AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 79-80 (1965).
"181. See EASTERBROOK& FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 93-99; id. at 93 ("Behind the business
judgment rule lies recognition that investors' wealth would be lower if managers' decisions
were routinely subjected to strict judicial review."); see also Butler & Ribstein, supra note
173, at 28-32 (arguing that "the fundamentally contractual nature of [managers'] fiduciary
duties means that they should be subject to the same presumption in favor of private
ordering that applies to other contracts"); Fischel, supra note 150, at 1265 (arguing that
proponents of legal reform designed to reduce agency costs "have failed to demonstrate the
existence of any problem of any kind, whether defined as accountability to shareholders or
to society as a whole").
182. See Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971) (stating that the
business judgement rule applies to decisions by executive officers); A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF
CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (1992) (applying business
judgment rule to "director or officer"); see also Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 288 (indicating
that professional managers are members of the corporate team who often make team-specific
investments).
183. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 99.
184. Id. at 103:
Duty-of-loyalty problems often involve spectacular, one-shot appropriations, of
the "take the money and run" sort, in which subsequent penalties through
markets are inadequate. Liability rules are most helpful when other
mechanisms fail. A manager on the verge of retirement is not likely to be
deterred from wrongdoing by the decline in his future wage. The duty of loyalty
supplements market penalties for breach in those situations where market
penalties themselves might be insufficient.
185. E.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (articulating
heightened standard of judicial review where managers adopt tactics that ward off tender
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Principal-agent theorists are not the only scholars who have
noticed the role that market mechanisms can play in aligning the
interests of shareholders and directors. Indeed, for decades
advocates of corporate social responsibility and other opponents
of the shareholder primacy norm have argued that market
mechanisms are in a sense too powerful, that is, force directors to
pursue shareholder wealth in a single-minded fashion. 86 Early in
their article, Blair and Stout do mention the assertion by principal-
agent theorists that market mechanisms constrain directors to act
in the interests of shareholders."i 7 Their subsequent discussion of
Delaware law, however, does not rebut or even allude to this
argument. 8 ' Instead they simply assert, without evidence or
offers); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,955 (Del. 1985) (same); Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (absent fraud, conflict of interest, or gross
negligence in gathering information, courtwill not disturb good-faith judgment); Flieglerv.
Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (DeL 1976) (scrutinizing conflict-of-interest transaction for
"entire fairness" despite disclosure to and ratification by shareholders).
186. E.g., Hetherington, supra note 178, at 185 ("IT]he most persistent complaint about
corporate managemenis behavior by the advocates of corporate responsibility is that in their
zealous pursuit of profits corporate managers have engaged in antisocial behavior.") (citing
RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 16-32 (1976)); Mitchell, supra note
19, at 1290-91 (arguing that pressure from institutional investors leads to undue director
focus on maximizing share prices); id. at 1301-17 (arguing that states should adopt reforms
that constitute directors as "mediators" among various corporate constituencies); see also
Donald E. Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals: Co-existence with Society, 60 GEO. L.J.
57 (1971); Elliot J. Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate
Governance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1981).
187. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 252 (noting the argument that "even though the legal
constraints on directors are weak, market constraints ... keep directors focused on
maximizing profits and share value"). Moreover, as noted earlier, Blair and Stout lament the
fact that "recently," market forces have caused directors to pursue shareholder interests
exclusively. See supra note 180. Principal-agent theorists, of course, would dispute the
assertion that market-induced concern for shareholders is a "recent" phenomenon. Id. At any
rate, Blair and Stout do not explore the implications of this phenomenon for their assertion
that Delaware law reflects a mediating hierarch conception of governance.
188. The argument that various market mechanisms constrain directors and thus obviate
the need for intensive judicial review is not at all obscure. Indeed, Judge Easterbrook and
Professor Fischel took this position in their pathbreaking work on corporate law.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 94-97 (arguing that market mechanisms obviate
the need for intrusive judicial review); cf Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual
Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. CRi. L. REV. 1391, 1392 & n.4 (1992)
(asserting that Easterbrook and Fischel's Economic Structure of Corporate Law "may be the
best book ever written about corporate law"); Johnston, supra note 172, at 232 (describing
Easterbrook and Fischel's application of the theory of the firm to questions of corporate law
as a "great and indeed revolutionary achievement").
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argument, that directors are "constrained primarily by their
fiduciary duties."'89
Blair and Stout's claim that the relationship between
shareholders and directors is best explained by means of a
mediating hierarch model does not rest solely upon the laxity of the
business judgment rule. As noted above, they also rely heavily upon
the various procedural obstacles to seeking relief from directors in
a derivative action. 9 ' These obstacles, they argue, further insulate
directors from shareholders, allowing directors to perform their
roles as mediating hierarchs. 9 ' Like the business judgment rule,
however, each of these doctrines is equally consistent with the
principal-agent model, so long as market mechanisms are taken
into account.
Consider, for instance, the requirement that shareholders make
a demand on directors before instituting litigation on the firm's
behalf.'92 Failure to make such a demand ensures dismissal of the
litigation, and a board's refusal to accede to such a demand is
ordinarily judged under the business judgment rule.'93 This
requirement dates from at least the nineteenth century, when, Blair
and Stout concede, courts adhered to a shareholder primacy
norm.'94 Moreover, the requirement is not limited to publicly held
corporations, but applies equally to those that are closely held. '95 At
189. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 291.
190. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
191. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 292-95.
192. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814-15 (Del. 1984).
193. Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194,212-14 (Del. 1991), overruled inpart on other grounds
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 777 (Del.
1990).
194. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 301 & n.127 (citing Koehler v. Black River Falls Iron
Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 715 (1862)); see also Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Smith,
supra note 7, at 296-304 (demonstrating that nineteenth-century courts adhered to the
shareholder primacy norm). Courts apparently believed that the demand requirement was
perfectly consistent with this norm.
195. Delaware courts routinely apply the demand requirement in cases involving closely
held corporations. E.g., Andreae v. Andreae, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,571, at 92,649 (Del. Ch. 1992); Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 611 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. Ch.
1991). Indeed, the leading Delaware decision regarding the demand requirement ordered the
dismissal of an action for failure to make a demand even though the plaintiffhad alleged that
the defendant directors were controlled by a single individual who owned forty-seven percent
of the firm's stock. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815-16. The court expressly stated that "even proof
of majority ownership of a company does not strip the directors of the presumptions of
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any rate, the requirement would seem to make perfect sense in
light of the separation of function that characterizes the modern
public corporation, a separation that principal-agent theorists
emphasize.196 As explained earlier, the separation of ownership
from control allows for specialization: shareholders contribute
capital and bear risk, while directors and managers bring to bear
their superior expertise managing the firm's assets. 9 ? A cause of
action-whether against directors or a supplier who is in breach of
contract-is an asset like any other, and thus, principal-agent
theorists suggest, properly left to the expertise of directors and
management. 9 ' Not only will these specialists be better equipped
than their principals to evaluate the strengths and benefits of such
claims, they will also have stronger incentives to do so in a
disinterested fashion. For, although market mechanisms align the
interests of directors with shareholders, they do little to ensure
that, for instance, small shareholders and their attorneys will act
in the interest of shareholders as a whole.'9 Indeed, some principal-
independence," with the result that, without more, the demand requirement applies in such
circumstances. Id. at 815; ef. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 281 n.74 (defining "private
corporation" as including companies "effectively controlled by a single shareholder or group
of shareholders").
196. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
197. Id.
198. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1917)
(Brandeis, J.) ("Whether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause of
action for damages is, like other business questions, ordinarily a matter of internal
management...."); Starrels v. First Natl Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1168, 1173 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("The persuasive rationale for the demand requirement
[under Delaware law] is that it allows directors to make a business decision about a business
question: whether to invest the time and resources of the corporation in litigation."); Spiegel,
571 A.2d at 773 ("The decision to bring a law suit or to refrain from litigating a claim on
behalf of a corporation is a decision concerning the management of the -corporation.");
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 105-06; Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey,
The Role of the Board inDeriuative Litigation: Delaware Law and the CurrentALI Proposals
Compared, 44 Bus. LAW. 503, 522 (1989) ("Obviously, no principled distinction can be drawn
between a board's decisions relating to corporate litigation generally and those relating to
other business matters. Indeed, a board's decision whether to pursue, settle, or forgo
litigation is, at bottom, a business decision.... ").
199. EASTERBROK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 101. Easterbrook and Fischel note that:
Shareholders with tiny holdings can bring derivative actions. Holders of small
stakes have little incentive to consider the effect of the action on other
shareholders, the supposed beneficiaries who ultimately bear the costs. If the
action appears to be a positive netvalue projectbecause of the possible recovery
of attorneys' fees, an attorney will pursue it regardless of its effect on the value
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agent theorists have gone so far as to suggest that the derivative
suit is an ineffective vehicle for overseeing directors and thus
should be abolished.2"0  Requiring shareholders to submit a
corporation's cause of action to directors and abide by their decision
makes perfect sense in light of these considerations and is thus
consistent with the principal-agent model.
Blair and Stout also place significant weight on the fact that
directors are not, as a formal legal matter, shareholder agents, but
are instead more akin to trustees.20 ' However, the mere fact that
directors are not shareholder agents for legal purposes does not by
itself undermine the analytical usefulness of the principal-agent
metaphor.0 2 At any rate, a determination that directors are trust-
ees merely begs the question: "Trustees for whom?" One could, of
course, conclude that they are trustees for shareholders, as some
influential scholars have argued.03
Of course, litigation to enforce fiduciary duties is not the only
legal mechanism that can align the interests of shareholders and
of the firm.
Id.; see also Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 65 (1991) (concluding that "the principal beneficiaries of cash payouts in
shareholder suits are attorneys").
200. See Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law:A Theoretical and EmpiricalAnalysis, 71 CORNELLL. REV.
261 (1988); see also Butler & Ribstein, supra note 173, at 28-32, 53-64 (arguing that
corporations should be free to opt out of fiduciary duties).
201. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 290-92.
202. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (relying on principal-agent
metaphor to justify judicial review).
203. See A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049
(1931) (arguing that directors should be viewed as trustees for shareholders); see also BERLE
& MEANS, supra note 172, at 247-76 (arguing that corporate directors should exercise powers
as trustees for shareholders); Smith, supra note 7, at 301-04 (discussing nineteenth-century
case law holding that directors are trustees for shareholders). Blair and Stout also point out
that courts usually characterize directors' duties as flowing to the corporation. Blair & Stout,
supra note 9, at 293-94. However, other scholars who oppose the shareholder primacy norm
have concluded that, in practice, courts have never given any meaning to this distinction.
David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKEL.J. 201,255 ("Delaware jurisprudence
has long described management's fiduciary duties as owing to 'the corporation and its
shareholders.' The meaning of the distinction (if indeed one was intended) has never been
explained."); Mitchell, supra note 19, at 1284 ("Although the traditional doctrinal formulation
[of fiduciary duties] ... directs those duties to the corporation (either exclusively or in
addition to the stockholders), the application of such duties reflects purely a stockholder-
centric view.").
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directors: shareholders can also vote poorly performing directors out
of office. Although Blair and Stout have asserted that shareholder
voting is an illusory institution,"4 closer analysis suggests that
shareholders do, in many cases employ the franchise to affect
corporate policy. For while corporate law allows for widely
dispersed shareholdings by diversified investors, it also allows
individual or institutional investors to obtain significant blocks of
a firm's shares, thereby attenuating the sort of free-riding problems
that might otherwise preclude effective monitoring. °5
Studies confirm that wealthy individuals and institutions hold
significant blocks of common shares in the nation's largest publicly
held corporations."0 Although such blocks rarely constitute a
majority of common shares, rules facilitating the solicitation and
exercise of proxies allow for effective collective action.07 This is not
to say that voting is always an effective mechanism of corporate
governance. Then again, principal-agent theorists have never said
that it should be. The whole point of separating ownership from
control is to centralize decision-making authority within a body of
specialist managers who have ready access to information about the
effects of various decisions on the firm's prospects.0 8 If market
204. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
205. See DEMSEIZ, supra note 41, at 231-33 (arguing that ability to amass significant
blocks of common shares can enhance incentive for effective monitoring and control).
206. E.g., Barnard, supra note 112, at 1140-57 (detailing concentration in institutional
holdings and rise in institutional activism); Harold Demsetz &Kenneth Lehn, The Structure
of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1156-57 (1985)
(finding that, on average, the five largest ownership interests in Fortune 500 corporations
collectively controlled twenty-five percent of each firm's outstanding shares); Edward B.
Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional ShareholderActivism, 79 GEO.
L.J. 445, 447-51 (1991) (describing significant increases in institutional ownership of stock
in public corporations).
207. E.g., Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics In Proxy Contests:
When Is Using A Rights Plan Right?, 46 VAND. L. REV. 503, 504-05 (1993) ("Proxy contests
have reemerged recently as an important part of the market for corporate control. After
years of indifference to corporate elections, dissident shareholders have turned once again
to the ballot box as a means of removing unwanted management."); see also DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 220 (1991 & Supp. 2000) (allowing a shareholder to obtain the list of fellow
shareholders absent a showing of improper purpose); Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Credit
Bureau of St. Paul, Inc., 290 A.2d 691 (Del. 1972) (ruling that a desire to communicate with
fellow shareholders as part of a proxy contest is a proper purpose that entitles a shareholder
to a shareholder list).
208. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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mechanisms align the interests of shareholders and managers,
voting becomes superfluous, a waste of shareholders' and society's
time and resources. 2°" The secondary role of shareholder voting,
then, is entirely consistent with the principal-agent conception of
the corporation.210
This is not to say that principal-agent theorists believe that
voting is entirely useless. Like fiduciary duties, voting can serve a
"backstop" role, filling in when market mechanisms might be
ineffective. Thus, states routinely require votes on so-called
"fundamental corporate changes," such as mergers and the like,
that occur when directors and managers are in the final period. 1'
Moreover, attaching votes to common shares facilitates the
operation of the market for corporate control.212 The existence and
structure of voting, then, seems quite consistent with the principal-
agent model of the corporation. Blair and Stout, on the other hand,
provide no convincing explanation for the continued existence of a
purportedly useless institution.213
209. EASTERBROOK &FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 63-89.
210. WINTER, supra note 173, at31 ("It is notorious that the vast majority of shareholders
in large corporations do not want the power to interfere in corporate affairs, would not use
it if they had it, and do not regard themselves as corporate overseers."); Michael P. Dooley,
Controlling Giant Corporations: The Question of Legitimacy, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
PAST & FUTURE 28, 38 (H. Manne ed., 1982) ("LT]he limited governance role assigned to
shareholders is intentional and is, in fact, the genius of the corporate form."); Fischel, supra
note 150, at 1276-77 (explaining that the modem corporation's genius is that it "enables
individuals who have wealth but lack managerial ability to invest while simultaneously
allowing professional managers who lack personal wealth to run enterprises. Shareholders
would be hurt rather than helped if they were given more power, which no doubt explains
why they show no enthusiasm for the constant proposals to increase their role.");
Hetherington, supra note 178, at 184-88, 190-99.
211. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (1991 & Supp. 2000) (requiring a shareholder vote
for an amendment to the certificate of incorporation); id. § 251 (requiring a shareholder vote
for merger); id. § 271 (requiring a shareholder vote for the sale of all or substantially all of
a firm's assets); id. § 275 (requiring a shareholder vote for dissolution of the firm).
212. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 4, at 70-71; Henry G. Manne, Some TheoreticalAspects of Share Voting:An Essay
in Honor ofAdolfA Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1430-31 (1964).
213. Cf. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 173, at 25 n.100 ("[T]he mere fact that such voting
rights have survived more than fifty years after Berle and Means concluded they were
meaningless is of some significance."). Blair and Stout do attempt to reconcile the existence
of shareholder voting with their mediating hierarch theory. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at
276-87. In particular, they argue that some member of the team must choose directors, and
that shareholders might as well do so because maximizing the value of a firm's stock can
benefit other members of the team as well. Id. at 277-78. However, if directors are in fact
1684
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B. Substantive Content of Directors' Duties
Despite the significant discretion that corporate law accords
corporate decision makers, courts do, in some cases, find that
directors have breached their duty of care. As noted earlier, Blair
and Stout also find support for their thesis in those decisions that
do find breaches of fiduciary duties, as well as decisions that
purportedly authorize directors explicitly to advance the interests
of nonshareholder constituencies at the expense of shareholders.
According to Blair and Stout, courts never require directors to
pursue shareholder welfare at the expense of others but instead
find directors liable only when doing so will advance the interests
of shareholders and other constituents who have made firm-specific
investments. 1" Thus, even if the presence of market mechanisms
could explain lax judicial oversight of shareholders' agents, as well
as the relative unimportance of shareholder voting, Blair and Stout
assert that the principal-agent model cannot account for the pattern
of cases in which courts do, in fact, find that directors have
breached their fiduciary duties.
Certainly a director who breaches his or her fiduciary duties will
most likely harm more than the firm's shareholders. A director who
stands by while managers run a firm into the ground or expose the
firm to tremendous liability injures shareholders, creditors, and
employees. 5 Moreover, the damages occasioned by such breaches
best characterized as mediating hierarchs, and not shareholder agents, it would seem to
follow that directors should appoint their own successors. See Mitchell, supra note 19, at
1302-03 (arguing that directors should be characterized as mediators among various
stakeholders and should therefore appoint their own successors). Moreover, if maximizing
share value can benefit other constituencies, then it is not clear what is to be gained by a
departure from the shareholder primacy norm.
214. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 289 (T]he benefits of such derivative actions inure
not just to shareholders, but to all stakeholders."); id. at 293 ("[S]hareholders are allowed to
sue derivatively not just to protect shareholders, but to protect the interests of all the
members of the coalition that comprises the firm."); id. at 298 ("Corporate law only permits
shareholders to bring successful derivative claims against directors in circumstances where
bringing such claims benefits not only shareholders, but other stakeholders in the coalition
as well.") (emphasis omitted).
215. See In re Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (finding a breach of the duty
of care where a director failed adequately to supervise two officers who deadlocked on how
to run the fi-m, thus driving it out of business); In re Caremark Intl, Inc., 698 A.2d 959 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (approving settlement of a claim that directors failed to oversee conduct that
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are usually paid directly into the corporate treasury, thus
generating cash to pay off creditors, be they banks or workers.216
This is true regardless of whether the firm is publicly held,
however, thus casting doubt on the assertion that a mediating
hierarch conception of governance drives such doctrines. At any
rate, the fact that a duty owed to shareholders might incidentally
benefit others does not by itself extend the duty to other
constituencies.217 If directors install a legal compliance program
that prevents price-fixing and thus saves the firm from treble
damages and criminal fines, they incidentally will thereby advance
the interests of consumers.21 Directors do not owe consumers a
duty of care, however.219 Thus, even if correct, Blair and Stout's
assertion that successful actions against directors benefit all
constituencies, while consistent with the mediating hierarch
conception of the public corporation, is equally consistent with the
principal-agent approach.
At any rate, Blair and Stout have overlooked significant case law,
most notably Smith v. Van Gorkom220 that does, in fact, impose
liability on directors for failing to advance the interests of
shareholders vis-A-vis other constituents and thus falsifies their
hypothesis. In Van Gorkom, the board of directors recommended,
and the shareholders approved, the sale of Trans Union to a
friendly bidder for a forty-five percent premium over the market
resulted in firm's conviction for mail fraud and civil liability of $98 million); In re Baxter Int'l,
Inc., 654 A.2d 1268 (Del. Ch. 1995) (considering stockholder derivative actions against
directors for failing to prevent employee misconduct that caused the corporation to be
suspended from receiving new government contracts).
216. But see infra note 228 and accompanying text (describing existence of a direct action
in which judgments are paid directly to shareholders).
217. Indeed, two leading proponents ofthe shareholder primacy norm expressly note that
a duty to maximize shareholder profits will incidentally benefit other constituencies.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 38 ("[Maximizing profits for equity investors
assists the other 'constituencies' automatically. The participants in the venture play
complementary rather than antagonistic roles.").
218. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963) (considering and
rejecting a claim that directors breached their duty of care byfailingto root out price-fixing).
219. Cf National Consumers Union v. Natl Tea Co., 302 N.E.2d 118, 121-22 (111. App. Ct.
1973) (holding that shareholder who wished to "sensitize" a firm about consumer demands
did not state a "proper purpose" entitling her to examine the firm's books and records).
220. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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price of the firm's shares.22' The Delaware Supreme Court found
that these directors had breached their duty of care by failing to
inform themselves adequately before recommending sale of the firm
to the bidder.222 The court held that further study may have
revealed that the negotiated purchase price understated the
"intrinsic" value of the firm. 223 Thus, the court remanded the case
to the trial court for a determination of the "fair value of the shares
represented by the plaintiffs' class, based on the intrinsic value of
Trans Union."22
4
Many have characterized Van Gorkom as the most important
Delaware decision in decades, 2 s and Delaware courts often cite it
as a definitive statement of the content of directors' fiduciary
obligations. 226 This watershed decision simply cannot be squared
with Blair and Stout's portrayal of Delaware's approach to fiduciary
duties. To begin with, the decision was not a derivative action, but
instead involved a class action by shareholders in their personal
capacity.227 Moreover, the court made it quite clear that any
damages determined by the trial court would be paid directly to the
shareholders and not to Trans Union's corporate successor.21 Most
importantly, the whole point of the decision and its progeny is that
directors have a fiduciary obligation to obtain the "highest value
221. Id. at 864-70.
222. Id. at 870-93.
223. Id. at 874-78.
224. Id. at 893.
225. Patricia A. Daniel, Recent Developments Concerning the Duty of Care, the Duty of
Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 631, 638 (1987) (calling Van
Gorkom "the most important recent case concerning the duty of care and the business
judgment rule"); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98
YALE L.J. 127, 127 (1988) (calling Van Gorkom "one of the most important... corporate law
cases of the decade"); Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the
Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 (1985) ("The Delaware Supreme Court in
Van Gorkom exploded a bomb."); see also Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 299 & n.121, 300 &
nn.122 & 124 (citing Van Gorkom for existence and content of duty of care).
226. E.g., Brehmv. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 n.45 (Del. 2000); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d
5, 11-12 (Del. 1998); Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1292 n.40 (Del.
1998).
227. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 863,864 & nn.1-3; see also CLARKsupra note 27, at 662-64
(analyzing distinction between direct and derivative actions).
228. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
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reasonably available" for shareholders should directors decide to
negotiate and recommend the sale of the company.229
Recognition of a direct shareholder action to enforce the duty of
care as articulated in Van Gorkom seems quite inconsistent with
the mediating hierarch model. Bidders, after all, have made
significant investments generating information about the target,
investments that are in large part specific to the firm in question."0
Moreover, other constituents of the target will, presumably, go to
work for or become creditors of any successful bidder. By
negotiating the highest price reasonably available for shareholders,
then, directors of a target firm allocate the net present value of the
firm's residual to shareholders, "at the expense of" the bidder and
the target's other constituencies.23 ' This course of action is
flatly inconsistent with the duties of mediating hierarchs as
Blair and Stout conceive them.232 In fact, some scholars have
argued that seeking high prices for shareholders in this situation
is a quintessential example of opportunism vis-A-vis other
229. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,361 (Del. 1993); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
at 893.
230. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender
Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982).
231. EASTERBROOK&FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 189 (noting that resistance to tender offers
merely transfers wealth from bidder to target shareholders).
It should be noted that many principal-agent theorists have criticized Van Gorkom quite
harshly. E.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40
BUS. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985) (calling Van Gorkom "one of the worst decisions in the history
of corporate law"). These critics do not, however, take issue with Van Gorkom's assumption
that directors owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders qua shareholders. Instead, they argue
that market mechanisms will ordinarily induce directors to act in shareholder interests, and
that courts should not second-guess director decisions to recommend a sale of the firm at a
substantial premium above its market value. Id. at 1439-51.
232. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanyingtext (describing duty of mediating hierarchs).
Indeed, Blair and Stout themselves state that paying damages caused by breaches of
fiduciary duty directly to shareholders would be inconsistent with their mediating hierarch
theory. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 295 ("If shareholders could be the direct recipients of
damages payments in derivative cases, the net effect would be similar to a dividend payment:
Shareholders as a group would become wealthier at the expense of the corporate entity. This
sort of wealth transfer usually harms creditors, employees, and other stakeholders in the
corporation."). While this statement refers only to derivative actions, its logic applies with
equal force to direct actions. Both sorts of action, after all, enforce the very same duty of care.
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constituencies.3 3 Shareholder primacy is the linchpin of Van
GorkoM.2
14
Although they do not discuss Van Gorkom, Blair and Stout do cite
several cases that purportedly endorse, over the objection of
shareholder plaintiffs, director action that subordinates the
interests of shareholders to those of other constituents.23 5 More
precisely, Blair and Stout point out that courts allow directors to
make charitable donations, protect local communities, forgo projects
that would harm creditors, and ward off takeovers that appear to
be in the interest of shareholders. 6 Each of these decisions, Blair
and Stout say, "explicitly authorizes directors to sacrifice
shareholders' interests to protect other constituencies."2 7
It is certainly true that some Delaware decisions affirm director
action that is favorable to nonshareholder constituencies.
Nonetheless, many actions that benefit nonshareholders in the
short run may well produce long term benefits for shareholders.2"8
As shown below, each of the decisions that Blair and Stout invoke
is consistent with the shareholder primacy norm, and some
unambiguously support it.
233. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 255; Lawrence E.
Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 70 TEX.L.REV. 579,607-10 (1992); Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 125-26 (1992).
234. It also should be noted that the conception of directors' fiduciary duties embraced in
Van Gorkom is applicable in the context of derivative actions as well. Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985) (holding that, once a
firm is "in play," directors must"obtainnthe highest price for the benefit ofthe stockholders")
(emphasis added); Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974) (enjoining proposed
sale based on showing that sale price was too low, thus suggesting that directors had
breached their duty of care by negotiating an inadequate price).
Moreover, Delaware courts have characterized as "derivative" actions those that challenge
efforts by directors to entrench themselves by warding off takeover proposals, thus
depressing the value of a firm's shares. Moran v. Household Intl, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059,1069-
73 (Del. Ch. 1985), affd 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); see also infra notes 276-80 and
accompanying text (describing so-called "duty to auction" under Delaware law).
235. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 301-03.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 303 (emphasis omitted).
238. Cf Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (holding that directors may consider interests of other
constituencies only when doing so will plausibly advance the welfare of shareholders); see
also supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
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Consider first the authority of directors to cause the corporation
to make charitable donations. To be sure, courts have given
directors substantial discretion to devote a corporation's resources
to charitable causes. 9 Moreover, all states have enacted statutes
authorizing corporate donations for charitable, scientific, and
educational purposes. 4 ° Yet, the breadth and nature of this
discretion is actually inconsistent with the mediating hierarch
model that Blair and Stout propose. That model, after all,
contemplates that directors will put aside shareholder interests
when doing so is necessary to protect or reward those constituencies
that have made team-specific investments.24' Yet, neither case law
nor statutes require directors to confine charitable contributions to
those entities that have made investments specific to the
corporation.242
Of course, some charities or other nonprofit organizations may
make investments that are specific to a public corporation. A
hospital, for instance, may build a cancer treatment facility on the
expectation that a pharmaceutical company will provide free or
below-cost experimental drugs for the facility's patients. There is no
reason to believe, however, that most or even a significant
proportion of the charities that firms patronize have, in fact, made
such investments. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting has
made no investments specific to any public corporation; yet, many
public corporations routinely contribute large sums to the entity.
Indeed, some scholars assert that corporate charitable contributions
too often reflect the personal predilections of managers or their
spouses and bear little or no relation to the corporation's
interests.43
If Blair and Stout's account of corporate charitable giving were
correct, one would expect corporations to target their largesse on
239. Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of
Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 605-09 (1997).
240. Id. at 602-05 (collecting and analyzing statutes).
241. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
242. See Kahn, supra note 239, at 603 (concluding that state statutes all "authorize
seemingly unlimited philanthropic contributions from corporate capital without regard to
whether the firm will be benefited thereby").
243. Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy, Executives'Pet Charities and theAgency
Problem, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1147 (1997); Kahn, supra note 239, at 609-20.
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entities that have, in fact, made firm-specific investments. One
would also expect reported cases finding breaches of the duty of
care where directors had strayed from this limitation.2"
Nevertheless, Blair and Stout provide no evidence that corporations
generally support charities that have made investments specific to
them; nor do they cite any case law that justifies corporate giving
on this ground.
24 5
Moreover, Blair and Stout do not consider whether alternative
explanations better account for the vast authority over charitable
donations that corporate law vests in directors. For instance, some
courts and scholars have suggested that, because corporations
receive significant benefits from the public, they have a correlative
duty to "give something back" to the community.246 This view
justifies corporate giving, regardless of whether such contributions
are profitable for the firm, and regardless of whether the recipients
have made firm-specific investments. Others have suggested that
corporate charitable contributions can and usually do serve the
financial interests of the firm by building political support,
generating favorable publicity, or even developing markets for a
firm's products.247 Indeed, donations to local charities can function
244. Of course, such suits would fare poorly under current law, given the business
judgment rule. But this simply begs the question of why Delaware courts would apply the
business judgment rule in such cases. If, as Blair and Stout claim, directors are constrained
"primarily by their fiduciary duties," one would expect courts to scrutinize such decisions
more carefully, to ensure that recipients of such gifts are, in fact, members of "the team."
Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 291.
245. The one decision that Blair and Stout do cite, Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson,
257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969), actually contradicts the mediating hierarch justification for
corporate giving. There the Court of Chancery approved as "reasonable" a corporate gift to
a foundation run by the firm's controlling shareholder. Id. at 405. The gift was made "to
provide a fund for the financing of a western camp for under privileged boys ... where [the
controlling shareholder] maintainfed] an underground home." Id. at 402. There is no
indication thatthe summer camp, whichwas apparently opened by the foundation, had made
any investments that were specific to the corporation. At any rate, the Court of Chancery
approved the gift for"deprived but deserving young people" as "reasonable" because "a large
segment of youth is alienated even from parents who are not entirely satisfied with our
present social and economic system." Id. at 405. Such a gift, the court said, would "provid[e]
justification for large private holdings, thereby benefiting [shareholders] in the long run." Id.
246. E.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 585-87 (N.J. 1953).
247. E.g., Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate Contributions To Charity: Nothing More Than
A Marketing Strategy?, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS 246
(Richard Magat ed., 1989) (listing several profit-related goals of corporate charity, including
stimulation of marketing, public relations, generation of long-term loyalty of workers and
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
as a hostage, creating goodwill that would be forfeited if the firm
were to depart from the community.'41 This second explanation
suggests that charitable giving is just another business decision,
over which directors should have broad discretion.249 Such
discretion, of course, is perfectly consistent with the principal-agent
model, particularly in light of the market mechanisms that can
discipline directors who cause the firm to make questionable
donations.5 Both explanations, of course, do a better job
accounting for the state of the law regarding charitable giving than
an explanation that treats directors as mediating hierarchs.
Blair and Stout also assert that courts have empowered directors
to consider the effects of a firm's activities on surrounding
communities, even when doing so is detrimental to shareholders.25'
Blair and Stout cite one case for this sweeping proposition:
Shlensky v. Wrigley.252 Shlensky, however, said no such thing, and
actually militates against the mediating hierarch view. There a
disgruntled shareholder challenged the decision by the corporation
that owned the Chicago Cubs not to install lights at Wrigley
Field.5 The plaintiff alleged that the Cubs' president and eighty-
percent shareholder, Philip Wrigley, made the decision for reasons
unrelated to shareholder welfare. More precisely, the plaintiff
alleged that Wrigley believed that baseball was a daytime sport and
consumers, and generation of tax benefits).
248. Cf supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text (firms can create credible
commitments to remain in a community by making investments specific to the region).
249. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, 93,277 & n.15 (Del. Ch. 1989), affd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)
(stating that corporate law allows directors to "follow a course designed to achieve long-term
value even at the cost of immediate value maximization" and thus allows directors 'to make
reasonable charitable contributions, to grant scholarships or take other action that will have
a direct or immediate positive impact upon the financial performance of the firm").
250. See Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder
Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1208-10 (1999) (describing how market constraints ensure that
corporate philanthropy advances shareholder welfare); see supra notes 246-48 and
accompanying text.
251. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 303.
252. Id. at 303 n.141 (citing Schlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)).
253. Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 777-78 (describing these allegations).
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that the installation of lights and night baseball would cause the
surrounding neighborhood to deteriorate.
Shlensky, of course, involved a closely held corporation and thus
would seem to be beside the point for scholars offering a theory that
applies solely to public firms.255 At any rate, while the Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the suit, it did
not hold that Philip Wrigley could consider local communities to the
detriment of shareholders, or, for that matter, use the firm's assets
to advance his personal beliefs. To the contrary, the court found it
necessary to hypothesize some shareholder-regarding rationale for
Wrigley's decision. 6 The court surmised that any deterioration of
the surrounding community might deter families from attending
ball games, thus justifying a refusal to install lights. 7 Moreover,
the court suggested that, were the neighborhood to deteriorate, the
corporation itself would suffer a reduction in the value of the
property where the stadium was located."5 It did not matter, the
court said, that other major league teams had installed lights and
were playing night baseball; directors were required to make an
independent business judgment, and could not simply mimic the
decisions of others. 9 The reasoning of Shlensky, then, is fully
consistent with the principal-agent conception of the firm, but
inconsistent with the mediating hierarch view.
Finally, Blair and Stout see significant support for their position
in Delaware case law regarding the proper role of directors in
responding to uninvited takeover bids. More precisely, Blair and
254. Id. at 778.
255. See Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 281 n.74 (defining as "private" a corporation that
is "nominally held by the public but effectively controlled by a single shareholder or group
of shareholders"). Elsewhere in their article, Blair and Stout argue that case law involving
closely held firms is not a useful guide for understanding the duties of directors in publicly
held firms. See id. at 301-02.
256. Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780 ("Plaintiff in the instant case argues that the directors
are acting for reasons unrelated to the financial interest and welfare of the Cubs. However,
we are not satisfied that the motives assigned to Philip K. Wrigley, and through him to the




259. Id. at 781 ("Directors are elected for their business capabilities and judgment and the
courts cannot require them to forego their judgment because of the decisions of directors of
other companies.").
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Stout note that Delaware courts allow directors to fend off
takeovers even when bidders offer a substantial premium over and
above the firm's current market value.26 ° Because "modern financial
theory" holds that the price of a security reflects the best estimate
of its true value, they reason, courts that allow defensive tactics in
these situations must be rejecting the shareholder primacy norm in
favor of a mediating hierarch approach.26'
This argument falls short. Certainly modern financial theory,
more precisely, the efficient capital markets hypothesis, holds that
the price of a common share reflects the best estimate of the net
present value of the pro rata earnings attributable to it.2 2
Moreover, principal-agent theorists have generally embraced the
efficient capital markets hypothesis.263 Still, rejection of this
hypothesis does not entail rejection of the shareholder primacy
norm or embrace of a mediating hierarch approach. Indeed, the
Delaware Supreme Court rejected the efficient capital markets
hypothesis in, of all cases, Smith v. Van Gorkom. There, the
directors invoked the hypothesis, arguing that they did not have to
perform a study of Trans Union's intrinsic value before
recommending a sale of the company but could instead rely upon
the price set by the stock market. 64 The court squarely rejected this
argument, holding that it was based upon what the court called "a
clearly faulty, indeed fallacious, premise," i.e., that a firm's share
price reflected its "true worth."265
While many principal-agent theorists have criticized Van Gorkom
for its rejection of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, the
decision quite plainly rests upon a shareholder primacy norm.266
Similarly, Delaware decisions approving defensive measures in the
face of substantial premia rest upon a desire to protect and enhance
260. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 304-05.
261. Id.
262. DOOLEY, supra note 28, at 473-82 (describing various versions of the efficient capital
markets hypothesis); id. at 245 (stating that efficient capital markets hypothesis is "perhaps
the best established economic postulate of our time").
263. E.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 173, at 34-35.
264. Smithv. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,875 (Del. 1985) (recounting director's argument).
265. Id. at 876.
266. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (explaining that Van Gorkom rested upon
shareholder primacy norm); see also Fischel, supra note 231, at 1448-49 (criticizing Van
Gorkom court for ignoring the efficient capital markets hypothesis).
1694 [Vol. 43:1629
2002] THE TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY OF CORPORATE LAW 1695
shareholder value.267 More precisely, Delaware courts have re-
cognized two legitimate bases for defensive tactics: protecting
shareholders from coercive, "underpriced" offers, and ensuring that
shareholders do not "mistakenly" accept offers that understate
the firm's "intrinsic value."26' To be sure, many principal-agent
theorists have called for more intrusive judicial scrutiny of
defensive tactics.269 On the other hand, some scholars equally
committed to the norm of shareholder primacy have endorsed
something like the Delaware approach as the best method of
maximizing shareholder wealth. Such an approach, which
recognizes only shareholder-regarding justifications for defensive
tactics, is inconsistent with the mediating hierarch model.
267. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 n.12 (Del.
1989) ("[W]e endorse the Chancellor's conclusion that it is not a breach of faith for directors
to determine that the present stockmarket price of shares is not representative of true value
or that there may indeed be several market values for any corporation's stock. We have so
held in another context."). The Chancery Court was even more explicit, rejecting the efficient
capital markets hypothesis, while at the same time holding that directors could adopt
defensive measures to enhance the welfare of shareholders.
This view [the efficient capital markets hypothesis] may be correct .... Perhaps
wise social policy and sound business decisions ought to be premised upon the
assumptions that underlie that view. But just as the Constitution does not
enshrine Mr. Herbert Spencer's social statics, neither does the common law of
directors' duties elerate the theory of a single, efficient capital market to the
dignity of a sacred text.
Directors may operate on the theory that the stock market valuation is
"wrong" in some sense, withoutbreachingfaithwith shareholders. No one, after
all, has access to more information concerning the corporation's present and
future condition. ... The record in this case refers to instances in which
directors did function on a theory that they understood better than the public
market for the firm's shares what the value of their firm was, and were shown
by events to be correct.
Paramount Communications, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514,
93,277.
268. Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for
Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAw. 247, 267 &
n.65 (1989) (summarizing Delaware law).
269. E.g., EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 4, at 171-74.
270. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 268, at 271-73 (arguing in favor of a proportionality
test under which management must justify defensive measures by showing the existence of
a threat to shareholder interests); id. at 267 n.65 (asserting that a departure from the
shareholder primacy norm where defensive tactics are concerned "would render most of
corporate law incoherent"); Macey, supra note 71, at 200-04 (arguing that in many instances
defensive tactics can enhance investor welfare).
271. Blair and Stout cite the Court of Chancery decision in Paramount Communications,
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Additional Delaware case law makes it even plainer that
directors must maximize shareholder value when responding to
tender offers. In particular, the Delaware Supreme Court has held
that, once it becomes clear that a firm will be sold to some bidder,
directors must do what they can to make sure that the highest
bidder prevails, regardless whether they might agree with the
highest bidder's future business strategy.272 Like the duties implied
in Van Gorkom, these duties are directly contrary to a mediating
hierarch approach.273 Bidders who offer a premium over other
potential purchasers may do so because they plan greater
restructuring of the target's operations-restructuring that may
appear opportunistic to other constituents.274 Nevertheless, the
Delaware Supreme Court has expressly held that directors may not
consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies in this
context unless necessary to further the interests of shareholders. 5
Inc., for the proposition that Delaware courts will sustain "a board's discretion to reject a
takeover bid at a substantial premium in order to protect the interests of the firm's
employees or the community." Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 304. To be sure, Time's Board
rejected Paramount's bid in part to "maintain[ ] a Time culture" of journalistic integrity.
Paramount Communications, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 193,268.
However, the court did not hold that preservation of the firm's culture could justify defensive
tactics. Instead, the court sustained the tactics because they were designed, in good faith, "to
achieve long-term value [for shareholders] even at the cost of immediate value
maximization." Id. 93,277. To be precise, Time's directors argued that thwarting
Paramount's $200 per share bid would allow the firm to pursue a long-term strategy that
would raise the price of the firm's shares to between $208 and $402. Id. 93,273; see also
id. 1 93,284 (characterizing directors' task as determining "whether it is the better course
[of action] from the shareholders' point of view collectively to cash out their stake in the
company now") (emphasis added).
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancellor's decision, holding that the
Directors properly rejected Paramount's offer because, inter alia, Time's shareholders were
insufficiently informed about the benefits of the competing offers. Paramount
Communications, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1153. The Court in no way relied on Time's concern for
its culture of journalistic integrity. See also supra note 267 and accompanying text
(summarizing Paramount's conclusion that directors can take defensive steps deemed
necessary to enhance long-term shareholder value).
272. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994);
Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284-85 (Del. 1988); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
273. See supra notes 266-72 and accompanying text.
274. See Mitchell, supra note 233, at 607-10; Orts, supra note 233, at 124-25.
275. Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at 182 (voiding tactics purportedly designed to protect creditors
because "[a] board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its
responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders");
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Nevertheless, Blair and Stout assert that Delaware's "duty to
auction" actually supports the mediating hierarch model. As they
point out, Delaware has limited the directors' duty to auction to
those cases in which a single entity or identifiable group threatens
to acquire a controlling block of the target firm's voting shares.276
Thus, they argue, the duty to auction only applies when a publicly
held corporation is about to become private.277 Coupled with this
limitation, they say, the duty to auction simply reflects the law's
recognition that public firms governed by a mediating hierarch
model may elect to adopt a different model by "go [ing] private."27
Absent such a decision to "go 0 private," they say, boards may
consider the interests of various constituents when responding to
a takeover bid.279
This attempt to explain away Delaware's duty to auction does not
withstand scrutiny. Firms need not "go private" to opt out of a
mediating hierarch model of governance. Indeed, as shown below,
the majority of public corporations have apparently rejected a
see also Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1285 ("The sole responsibility of the directors in
such a sale is for the shareholders' benefit."); id. at 1286-87 ("Directors are not required by
Delaware law to conduct an auction according to some standard formula, only that they
observe the significant requirement of fairness for the purpose of enhancing shareholder
interests. ... [Tihe board's primary objective, and essential purpose, must remain the
enhancement of the bidding process for the benefit of the stockholders.").
276. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 309; see also Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d
at 1150-51 (holding that Revlon duties do not attach whire directors propose a merger that
leaves the firm's stock dispersed among the public).
277. Blair & Stout, supra note 9, at 309.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 308-09. Blair and Stout cite Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A-2d 946
(Del. 1985), for the proposition that, in responding to hostile bids, directors may take account
of "'the impact on ... creditors, customers, employees and perhaps even the community
generally. Blair& Stout, supra note 9, at 308 (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955). The quoted
language, however, was dicta: The directors of Unocal did not argue that their defensive
tactics were designed to further the interests of nonshareholder constituencies. Moreover,
the court sustained the defensive tactics because they protected shareholders from an
inadequate and coercive offer. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956-58; see also MillsAcquisition Co., 559
A.2d at 1287 n.38 (describing Unocal as a decision in which "this Court has upheld actions
of directors when a board is confronted with a coercive 'two-tiered' bust-up tender offer")
(emphasis added). Subsequent Delaware case law holds that the duties of directors
articulated in Unocal areno different from those articulated inRevlon. MillsAcquisition Co.,
559 A.2d at 1287 (stating that, when a shift in control is imminent, "the enhanced duties of
the directors in responding to a potential shift in control, recognized in Unocal, remain
unchanged," and noting that, "[tihis principle pervades Revlon").
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
mediating hierarch approach by vesting de facto control in full-time,
inside directors. 2 0 At any rate, the duty to auction cannot be
squared with the mediating hierarch model. Yes, a firm becomes
private once a single entity purchases a controlling block of its
shares. Before such a purchase, and during any auction, the firm
remains public and, under Blair and Stout's approach, properly
subject to a mediating hierarch model of governance. Indeed, the
rationale for a mediating hierarch model would seem to be strongest
at this point, when the firm is in the final period. It is at this very
moment, when directors are choosing whether to take the firm
private, that employees and creditors are most vulnerable to
opportunism, as shareholders seek to maximize the proceeds of any
auction by selling to the highest bidder.281' The highest bidder, of
course, may be the firm or individual who will do the most violence
to the settled expectations of employees, creditors, or the
community.
Embrace of a mediating hierarch model of governance would
require courts to reject a duty to auction, even when a firm was
taking itself private. Indeed, allowing public firms to opt out of the
mediating hierarch model simply by selling a controlling block to
the highest bidder would deprive directors of the ability to make a
credible commitment against opportunism, thus undermining the
effectiveness of such a model.282 Nevertheless, courts have held that
directors must take whatever steps are necessary to obtain the
highest possible bid for shareholders when it is clear that some
bidder will obtain a controlling block.83 This rejection of a
mediating hierarch approach when it is most needed casts serious
doubt on Blair and Stout's characterization of Delaware corporate
law.
280. See infra notes 286-91 and accompanying text.
281. McDaniel, supra note 90, at 434-35 ("[Iln a takeover contest managers may become
more willing to sacrifice existing bondholders in order to maximize stockholder gains .... The
manager of a target corporation may decide he is in the final period and act accordingly.");
see also supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (discussing the risk that managers and
shareholders will exploit other constituencies of the corporation.
282. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (showing that Blair and Stout's
mediating hierarch model is designed to empower fi-ms to make a credible commitment
against opportunism).
283. Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1285-87.
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In the end, the various doctrines that Blair and Stout invoke are
entirely consistent with a principal-agent conception of corporate
governance. Moreover, some of these doctrines are inconsistent with
a mediating hierarch approach. Contrary to Blair and Stout's
assertion, then, Delaware law reflects a principal-agent approach.
Adoption of a mediating hierarch model, on the other hand, would
require significant changes in Delaware's corporate law.
C. Rejection of the Mediating Hierarch Model in Practice
Blair and Stout have failed to address powerful evidence that
contradicts their thesis, namely the failure of states or public
corporations to constitute directors as the sort of mediating
hierarchs they envision. For decades, numerous corporate law
scholars have urged states to mandate that the boards of public
corporations consist solely of truly independent directors. 4 States
have simply rejected these proposals, however. While corporate law
allows shareholders to elect boards that are truly independent of
themselves, management, and employees, there is no requirement
that they do so in practice. To be sure, a majority of the directors of
large publicly held corporations are not employed by the firm and
hence can be deemed "outside directors."285 Despite this nominal
independence, however, scholars generally agree that boards of
directors are beholden to management. The Chairman of the Board,
for instance, is almost always the current CEO or another officer of
the company. 86 Moreover, by virtue of his or her dominant position
within the firm, and position as Chairman of the Board, the CEO
can influence, if not control outright, the selection of inside and
outside directors. 7 Further, the CEO and other prominent officers
284. DOOLEY, supra note 28, at 200-02 (describing reform proposals).
285. JAY W. LORSCH & ELZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF
AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 17-18 (1989).
286. See James A. Brickley et al., Corporate Leadership Structure: On the Separation of
the Positions of CEO and Chairperson of the Board (Aug. 23,1995) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the author). Professor Brickley and his coauthors surveyed 737 large firms and
reported that over 80% of these companies united the office of Chairman of the Board and
CEO in the same person. Moreover, another 17% of the sample selected as chairmen
individuals who were either former CEOs or occupants of other high offices. Only 2.57% of
the sample had chairmen who were not current or former employees of the company.
287. ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, WATCHING THE WATCHERS: CORPORATE
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are able to control the direction of the board. The CEO can literally
"set the agenda"-deciding what general issues the full board will
address."' He or she can also influence the board informally, by
presenting options in a way that frames issues in a manner of
managers' choosing.8 9
Thus, while the public corporation is often subject to the nominal
control of outside directors who could, theoretically, act as
mediating hierarchs, actual control of such firms resides in inside
directors, particularly the CEO. States or corporations could confer
more actual authority on outside directors, empowering them to act
as true mediating hierarchs.290 They have not, thus undermining
Blair and Stout's assertion that a mediating hierarch model of
governance is superior to the shareholder primacy norm.291
GOVERNANCE FORTHE 21ST CENTURY 182-84, 195-96 (1996) (opining that the CEO plays an
important, even dominant role in the selection of director candidates").
288. CLARK, supra note 27, at 108 (stating that officers initiate and shape corporate
decisions and the directors simply approve them); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside
Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
898, 914 (1996) ("[Slince most CEOs also serve as the chairman of the board, the CEOs often
control both the agenda of the board meetings and the amount of information given to the
board supporting the agenda.").
289. Lin, supra note 288, at 914 ("Rather than presenting all of the possibilities to the
board, management may present only the project it prefers. Under these circumstances,
outside directors may end up approving [the wrong] project ... because they are unaware of
the other possibilities.").
290. For instance, firms could provide in their bylaws that the Chairperson of the Board
would be an outside director.
291. Corporate law does sometimes encourage firms to employ outside directors to review
or approve certain transactions. For instance, although courts will defer to decisions by
outside directors setting management compensation, similar determinations by inside
directors will be subject to more exacting scrutiny. Lin, supra note 288, at 905 & nn.35-36
(discussing Delaware authorities); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991 & Supp. 2000)
(removing common law bar to interested director transactions if such decisions are approved
by outside directors). But see Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (DeL 1976) (conducting
fairness review despite approval by shareholders pursuant to title 8, section 144 of the
Delaware Code). Because firms cannot opt out of these rules by contract, their existence does
not reflect firms'judgment that outside director review of such transactions is cost-effective.
At any rate, it would appear that such rules are crafted to protect shareholders from
opportunism by managers, thus undermining the assertion by Blair and Stout that the
structure of fiduciary duties is limited to regulation of conduct that injures several
constituencies. See Moran v. Household Intl, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (stating
that defensive tactics blessed by outside directors receive extra deference); see also supra
notes 214-15 and accompanying text (describing assertion by Blair and Stout that, based on
a director's fiduciary duties, courts only penalize conduct of the director that injures several
constituencies).
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CONCLUSION
The "principal-agent" model, which implies a shareholder
primacy norm, is the dominant paradigm of corporate law. Blair
and Stout have offered a competing paradigm, in which directors
of public corporations act as "mediators" between various
constituencies that make investments specific to the corporate
team. According to these scholars, this mediating hierarch model of
corporate governance is superior to a principal-agent conception, as
it empowers directors to make credible commitments to refrain
from opportunism and thus enhances the public corporation's
ability to attract team-specific investment. Blair and Stout claim to
find support for their thesis in Delaware corporate law which, they
say, is inconsistent with a principal-agent model but entirely
consistent with a mediating hierarch conception.
This Essay has offered a rebuttal to Blair and Stout's thesis. As
an initial matter, it does not appear that departure from the single-
owner standard that characterizes private firms will in fact reduce
the risk of opportunism where public corporations are concerned.
There is no reason to believe that nonshareholder participants in
public corporations face a greater risk of opportunism than their
counterparts in private firms. If anything, certain inherent
attributes of publicly held corporations ultimately render such
constituents less vulnerable to opportunism than similar
participants in private firms. At the same time, it seems clear that
shareholders of public corporations are more vulnerable to
opportunism than those who supply equity capital to private firms,
and thus are more in need of the sort of protection provided by the
shareholder primacy norm. As a result, there is no apparent reason
why the law of public corporations should depart from the single-
owner approach that characterizes private firms.
At any rate, even if a mediating hierarch model could reduce the
prospect of opportunism and enhance a firm's ability to attract
team-specific investment, such an approach to firm governance
would entail significant ownership costs, costs that would likely
outweigh any purported benefits of such a model. By vesting
ultimate control over the public corporation in disinterested
arbiters, the mediating hierarch model would deprive society of
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many of the benefits ordinarily associated with the corporate form.
Precisely because they are disinterested, hierarchs would lack the
sort of hands-on expertise that normally characterizes many
corporate directors. More importantly, mediating hierarchs would
have no claim to the team's residual product, and they would not be
accountable to anyone who did. Thus, they would have little
incentive to maximize anything other than their own welfare and
therefore would not be effective monitors of the team under their
supervision.
Delaware corporate law does not support Blair and Stout's thesis.
To be sure, the law of Delaware grants directors broad discretion of
the sort consistent with a mediating hierarch model of governance.
However, this grant of discretion is equally consistent with a
principal-agent model, particularly when one considers the various
market mechanisms that encourage directors to pursue shareholder
interests. Indeed, certain aspects of Delaware law-most notably
the "duty to auction"-are flatly inconsistent with a mediating
hierarch model, and only consistent with a principal-agent account.
Delaware, at least, has apparently decided that the principal-agent
model, and with it the shareholder primacy norm, is superior to
alternative models of corporate governance.
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